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IN LUCE TUA
Comment on C ontemporary Affairs by the Editor
Up from Compassion?
Friends of liberalism speak admiringly of its sense of
compassion; its critics see rather a tendency to sentimentality. (Similarly, conservatism's adherents praise
its realism while its enemies talk of its callousness.) It's
not surprising when non-liberals declare liberalism's
emphasis on compassion to be misguided as a primary
basis for the making of public policy, but it is something to be remarked upon when such an argument
comes from within the Left itself, as in the recent
essay by liberal Mickey Kaus in the liberal (or neo-liberal) New Republic ("Up from Altruism," December 15,
1986).
Compassion, Kaus insists, "is a miserable basis for
liberal politics," because it "carries the unmistakable
implication of dependence and piteousness on the part
of those on the receiving end of the sentiment." The
aim of liberal politics, he says, "should be not to increase the incidence of compassion, but to· reduce the
opportunity for it. Compassion isn't politics." When
people in need of particular government assistance
turn to Washington for help, "it is (or should be) as
self-reliant citizens, and it's a terrible mistake to mix
up their plight with the 'weak and unfortunate' charity
cases. Charity is a noble impulse. But it is not the relation of free , equal citizens."
Compassion politics, Kaus goes on, is impractical : "it
provides no principle to tell us when our abstract compassionate impulses should stop." Rather than such a
hopeless and limitless emphasis on altruism, liberals
should base their belief in affirmative government on
the politics of the general interest. Kaus suggests three
obvious current general interests: in civility (being able
to walk the streets without fear of being mugged), in
not having to spend huge sums "to support ever larger
generations of impoverished, broken homes," and in
economic growth.
Liberals can make a good case, he concludes, that
activist government programs are required to achieve
these and other general interest goals: "If liberals
build a new, lasting movement, it won't be because
they convince enough people to be compassionate, or
because they convince enough people that they are entitled to have others be compassionate toward them ,
but because enough people correctly see their own interest in solving the problems of others."
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Kaus' argument will encounter stiff resistance, we
suspect, because it is so flatly counter-intuitive to those
of liberal persuasion. Indeed, among that considerable
number of people on the Left whose political principles are rooted in religious beliefs, Kaus may well appear morally tone-deaf and oblivious to J udeo-Christian moral imperatives. Surely, it will be argued, those
of biblical faith bring to the consideration of their
neighbors' needs something more than an attitude of
enlightened self-interest.
But note that Kaus is speaking of public policy, not
private activity or general motivation. Charity is noble,
but it isn't politics. What free and equal citizens of a
nation owe each other in the public forum is not love
but justice. Love may motivate us, but it cannot provide the substance of our politics. Love gives without
counting the costs; a pol.iUcl.tll~t <j~e~'t count costs is
.
.
feckless and IrrespQttS\b~ • • • •• ·: • •. •
Social welfare .P-of~its· constitute a~ ·e.;i~dtial element
of decent govQ"n.me.nt, but such policie; )'lfy$t always
be administer~!I .with careful regard for tbt'j.c effects
"
on their recip•J.PQ<~.
U> ;l)c:/aS:
~
• w.,
l\>\-' :W""*
~ ~~
•
.. • • ~~§.
• • rto~
• . a society of free and e{il!i~~ot~~~.. Ii·e~t" or:e" or bet~factors
and dependen\S; There-1'tlt • .Zl"'a~. l>eo"'\hosei~ng us
who cannot ci;t•.for ili~~e1tis"~itcr,~·whMl.~e owe
support and, yis.: tompassion, but a socie~.tli~t in ordinary circumsta~i~!··';iews any substanti.tlJ)ortion of
its citizenry as obj&it Crt charity has •;s.a!~ir:·umbed to a
muddled and decadent: public philoso}>hy.
All of which explains why Mario Cuomo's celebrated
"society as family" speech to the Democratic Convention in 1984 was, however eloquent, fundamentally
misguided. We love and sacrifice for our families without regard to anyone's deserving. We owe them that
because they are family. It is political madness to
suggest that we owe everyone in our society in the
same measure. Such analogical reasoning destroys all
sense of proportion, all sense of publidprivate distinction. That way lies moral unboundedness and political
absurdity.
Much of Christian political rhetoric finds it difficult
to establish the boundaries here suggested. They can
in fact never precisely be defined, but they do exist.
Lutherans ought to be better situated than most Christians to help locate them. We have the doctrine of the
Two Kingdoms: we ought to put it to creative use.

. ..· ... ... ...
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..

••
••
3

James V. Bachman

OF PLURALISM, TRUTH, AND ABORTION
A Constructive Role for Skepticism in Public Discourse

Democratic pluralism pursues a tolerance in matters
moral that will "live and let live." In many issues it
achieves its goal. But there are issues that refuse readily to reduce to the principle of "live and let live."
Abortion is one of those issues. The 1973 Roe v. Wade
decision on first-trimester abortions attempted to impose a "live and let live" toleration upon the United
States. A dozen and more years later it appears that
that attempt is in trouble.
Many who cha~pi~ le~cratic pluralism are dismayed abovt \tt~. :t>ai
·~t..-tpink they grasp what
needs to .be-Qbit"e effectively to "pip~fJ. pluralism in the
heat of. tnt:. abortion debate. It wil l not be sufficient
simply.~:·r~pe~t the Roe v. Wade arg~:ent. The problem is· ~:tiv4 :.P ivi~ )ji a£~ilmtl~~ w_6"public signifi·~ ·
cance .gi•the ongoing ·c\o~rti'ort a~ate .while still protectin!l·~ priJ!\:iPt~s .~r. ddth¢tatic vl~<talism. In the
followi'Jj! l. arg~e "th:ai "fu=ertc: ts" i :Way !it; can be done.
The alt;f.native that most vigor(j't.rd'y seeks to overturn Ro; ·J'~· .Wade is one that .(J~~s a fundamental
threat to dehtpqatic pluralisfli~ ·"{h~ argument is pressed in many ways, but its coreo is the assertion that society is founded upon and needs a common morality
to bind it together. So-called "abortions of convenience" are claimed to be an affront to the morality that
underlies and binds together American society. Proponents of the "majority morality," therefore, have not
only the right, but the obligation, to impose upon the
country that morality which is essential to its very life.
I will call this argument the "majority morality" argument. It is a threat to democratic pluralism, because

i:Jo

.. . ...... .. .. ..., .

James V. Bachman, a graduate of Valparaiso University,
is pastor of the University Lutheran Chapel at Florida State
University and an Adjunct Assistant Professor in the FSU
Department of Philosophy. He has earned an M.A. in Theology at Cambridge University (where he was a Fulbright Fellow), an M .Div. at Concordia Seminary, St. Louis, and a
Ph.D. in Philosophy at Florida State.
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it offers a convenient scheme for overruling minority
beliefs and practices all over the moral map. Yet this
argument tempts a number of thoughtful people who
are troubled that the Roe v. Wade line of argument
simply removes from effective public discussion any
consideration of the first-trimester abortion decision . I
argue that there is a way to provide for effective public discussion without appealing to the priority of the
"majority morality." If I am successful, I should be
able to persuade a number of the current opponents
of the Roe v. Wade decision not to go over to the
"majority morality" camp.
The argument turns on the making of careful distinctions between "skepticism," "absolutism,"
relativism," and "reductionism" in public debate. The
"majority morality" argument is a species of relativism ;
the main Roe v. Wade argument is reductionist, and
the alternative I am proposing is skeptic. I first offer
brief definitions of skepticism and its three competitors. I then illustrate the distinctions and argue for
skepticism by examining public discourse about abortion.
These definitions and distinctions are applicable to
a wide range of philosophical issues, but I here restrict
them to the concern with ethics and public policy.
1. The moral skeptic says that factors in the world and
in (the possibly creative) human empirical and cognitive
responses probably all work together to produce one
unique, common moral reality, and there can be only
one universal and true account corresponding to it.
Human beings, however, do not seem to be on the way
to giving that one universal and true account.
2. The moral absolutist says that factors in the world
and in (the possibly creative) human empirical and cognitive responses all work together to produce one
unique, common moral reality of which it is possible to
give one universal and true account. Human beings are
capable of giving that one universal and true account.
3. The moral relativist says that factors in the world
and in the creative human empirical and cognitive responses all work together to produce more than one
moral reality. Relative to the way in which moral reality
arises for an individual, his reality and his truth will difThe Cresset

fer from the reality and truth that arises for another.
Human beings make more or less progress toward discerning the truth as it is given relative to them.
4. The moral reductionist says that factors in the world
and in (the possibly creative) human empirical and cognitive responses may all be causal factors leading to the
langu~ge of morality. But moral talk is, at best, disguised talk about something else, and , for all practical
purposes, empty.
II

An absolutist would argue that there is one true account about whether abortion in the first trimester is
right or not and that this truth can be publicly determined and shared. The absolutist usually advises that
we should proceed with educated debate and discussion in order to achieve widespread public perception
of the truth. Then public policy can be made to reflect
the truth that thoughtful people share. If the truth is
that abortion in the envisioned circumstances is right,
then public policy should allow it; if not, then it
should ban it.
Absolutists of this sort face tough going in the abortion debate, because the empirical evidence of widespread, ineradicable disagreement is so strong. Still,
the ideal is pursued on all sides of the abortion debate.
People try again and again to make a publicly
reasoned case. The spirit of these attempts is captured
in these words from Father James Burtchaell, a
Roman Catholic theologian:
The church does not have a law on abortion , any
more than it has a law on embezzlement or a law on
gossip or a law on child abuse. It does have a wisdom
on these matters. And that wisdom, if it has any sense
behind it, should be accessible to others whose grounding is not in our faith. In fact, one of the better tests
of our moral discourse should be our ability to plead its
soundness to others besides ourselves. (Burtchaell in
Neuhaus, 1985, 3)
Burtchaell is saying that his public arguments have
to be able to transcend the boundaries of a particular
faith. The absolutist's hope is that his arguments,
grounded in the truth, will be found to be sound by
thinking people everywhere, regardless of their particular faith or lack of it.
Even the most confident absolutist, however, will
have trouble ignoring the fact that, when the issue is
abortion, a large number of people continue over
many years to be ranged on the side opposite to what
he takes to be the truth. What does this mean for public policy? One strategy for the absolutist is simply to
dig in. Hard experience may force him to concede
that truth does not always win recognition, but he will
still think that public policy should reflect reasoned acceptance of the truth of the matter. This kind of abMarch, 1987

solutist can be seen doggedly continuing to make his
public arguments and looking for signs of a movement
toward the truth. I think he is on the wrong track, but
I admire his commitment to publicly reasoned argument.
If the frustrated absolutist decides to give up on his
attempts to make a public case for the truth, my distinctions suggest there are at least three different
stances he might choose in public discourse. He could
become a skeptic, a relativist, or a reductionist.

This is the key problem I wish to
address: What public stance should
a rational person take when he
recognizes that his private
convictions on a disputed issue such
as abortion cannot command rational
agreement in public discourse?
The picture becomes complicated at this point, so
some preliminary comments are in order. I am going
to be arguing that he should adopt the stance of a
skeptic in public discourse. This does not mean that he
would necessarily give up his own private convictions.
All that is intended is that he would acknowledge that
at least some of the principles upon which his private
convictions are based are not principles that command
widespread rational agreement in public debate.This is
the key problem I wish to address: What public stance
should a rational person take when he recognizes that his private convictions cannot command rational agreement in public discourse?
It appears that in the face of this problem many
people today adopt a relativist stance. Before recommending skepticism I will analyze and criticize the relativist option. Hard experience has convinced many
that a plurality of "truths" about abortion will always
be competing for respect in public debate. Persons
who adopt the relativist approach are usually prepared
to allow that each group, following its own "truth,"
should be free to contend in the public sphere to have
its own "truth" become public policy.
In return for this allowance, however, those who
adopt a relativist stance in public discourse seem regularly to demand the right to attempt to make public
policy in the image of their own "truth." The strategy
is different, but the goal is the same as that adopted
by an absolutist. Public policy should be made to reflect the truth. But the relativist will not waste his effort trying to reason with his opponents. Instead, as a
wise relativist, he will use all the tools of persuasion
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available to forge a public coalition capable of instantiating its "truth" in public policy.
This relativist response is often seen in contemporary approaches to public policy questions about abortion. Many seem to have decided that reasoned discussion is not of much use in public debate. The whole
point of democracy is now seen to be simply to contend for my own "truth." The goal remains to instantiate my own truth in public policy, but in the light of
irreconcilable disagreement in the public sphere, I no
longer seek to achieve my goal by reasoned argument.
Instead my strategy is simply to organize in whatever
way is politically effective to bring about the policy
that matches my belief.
In public debates some are tempted simultaneously
to pursue an absolutist and a relativist course. They
will appeal to reasoned argument, since privately they
think they know the one and only truth. But when
reason fails in the public sphere, they then adopt a relativist stance. As relativists they give up the task of
criticizing opposing views. Instead, the strategy is to
grant that each view is, practically speaking, "falsehood
free ." This move protects one's own "truth" from
further criticism. Relativists reason that the fact of our
ineradicable public disagreements has thrown us into

THE CRESSEY
The Question
Of the Ordination
Of Women
The Cresset was pleased to publish the position
papers of Theodore Jungkuntz and Walter E.
Keller on "The Question of the Ordination of
Women" in its regular pages.
In response to reader interest, the Cresset is
further pleased to announce that reprints of both
position papers in one eight-page folio are now
available for congregational and pastoral conference study.
Please accompany reprint orders with a check
payable to the Cresset and mail to:

The Cresset
Vlllpsrsiso University
Vlllpsrsiso, Indians 46383
Single Copy, 25t;
10 Copie• for 20t; EliCh
100 Copi•• for 15t; EliCh
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a relativist "falsehood-free-for-all." And in this rough
and tumble "free-for-all" relativists then proceed to organize so that it is their truth that ends up with the
most votes.
It is popularly believed that the adoption of a relativist stance will encourage each side to be more moderate in what it seeks in public policy. But this belief
is ill-founded both theoretically and practically. It
misses the mark theoretically, because nothing in relativism requires that a relativist include a commitment
to tolerance in his recognition of multiple truths.
Nothing prevents my thinking that my "truth" should
prevail over yours.
Popular belief that relativism can be tolerant also
misunderstands practical public relativism. The typical
relativist in public debate is an absolutist in private belief. The failure of public reasoning has tempted the
absolutist to adopt a relativist stance as a way of stilling
the endless public round of point and counter-point.
In private life, however, he continues to cherish his
deep moral beliefs. We should not expect to find him
functioning in a moderate and tolerant way in the
publicly relativist "falsehood-free-for-all."
In public debates over abortion relativism seems to
arise mainly when an erstwhile absolutist despairs of
the power of reason to bring success in the practical
world of public debate. Attention is then turned to
persuasion and techniques of political organization
that offer hope of making my "truth" become the publicly sanctioned truth. Given this motivation, it is unlikely that the public relativist will be respectfully tolerant of those to whom he is opposed.
In the public sphere it will be formally allowed that
each person's "truth" has as many rights as the next
person's. But that is only a strategy to give my "truth"
a foothold . The whole exercise becomes simply one of
"wise" relativist persuasion aimed at getting the most
votes. This opens the door for what I above described
as the "majority morality" argument.
In the United States the so-called Moral Majority
has mobilized itself along these lines with some notable
success. "Neoconservatives" also seem to be tempted to
employ the "majority morality" argument. I find it a
nice irony that persons who take strongly absolutist
positions privately nevertheless function relativistically
in the public sphere. They would, of course, say that
in a pluralistic democracy there is little else that a committed absolutist can do. But settling for this relativist
strategy risks losing all the virtues of democratic
pluralism. It risks a return to the tyranny of the
majority.
Opponents of the "majority morality" argument
often seek to defend democratic pluralism by resorting
to what I call a reductionist strategy. The reductionist
The Cresset

hopes to get beyond public disagreement by showing
that persistent public disagreement indicates that there
really is nothing public to be decided here at all. When
rational, public discussion fails to bring agreement, it
is tempting to think that it will be best to end public
discussion and to leave the issue to private decision.
This seems to be the main line of thought in the Roe
v. Wade decision.
Reductionists often embellish their case by arguing
that the only facts relevant to the discussion have to do
with personal attitudes, beliefs, passions, and ambitions, matters far removed from any empty words
about a genuine public truth concerning a fetus' right
to life. The reductionist stance on the abortion issue
often tends toward the view that what is actually being
played out in the public arena is only some kind of
struggle for power and domination. The reductionist
strategy is to change the public topic. The goal is to
discover what "real" public issues the abortion debate
is masking and to have us get on with the real struggle. But the original issue should no longer be open
for public discussion and decision.

The reductionist stance on the
abortion issue often tends toward the
view that what is actually being
played out in the public arena is only
some kind of struggle for power and
domination. The reductionist strategy
is to change the public topic.
In current discussions the reductionist often casts
the "real" issue as that of the antagonism between society's power and the individual's right to privacy. This
kind of reductionist sees himself as the champion of
the individual against the power of the collective. He
is definitely defending democratic pluralism, but to
make his argument he must convince us that there is
no point to further public deliberation about firsttrimester abortions. The empirical fact of persistent
public disagreement supports his case. But widespread
uneasiness about the deep significance of the abortion
decision makes it hard to remove the issue entirely
from effective public scrutiny.
It is interesting to observe that pro-life forces often
take the relativist line in public debate, while prochoice forces take the reductionist line. This may be
partly a function of each party's assessment of the
political climate. The pro-life forces have reason to
think that they can marshal a legislative majority in beMarch, 1987

half of their "truth." Therefore they are ready for a
relativist "falsehood-free-for-all" struggle. The prochoice forces often seek to change the topic from
abortion to the right to privacy. This may be because
they fear losing in a relativist falsehood-free-for-all.
I offer a concrete example of the public line being
drawn in exactly this way between the relativist and
the reductionist. In a separate essay I have argued that
Richard Neuhaus' views on public discourse about
abortion are relativist in the way described above.
Commenting on what he takes to be the gross error of
the Roe v. Wade decision he says:
there is nothing in store but a continuing and deepening crisis of legitimacy if courts persist in systematically
ruling out of order the moral traditions in which Western law has developed and which bear, for the overwhelming majority of the American people, a living
sense of right and wrong. The result, quite literally, is
the outlawing of the basis of law. When the moral sentiments and the traditions that have given them shape
and voice are ruled out of order, even the most solemn
questions are "resolved" by mechanistic reduction to the
lowest possible factor. Thus in Roe v. Wade, the questions of the meaning of human life and who belongs to
the human community for which we accept common responsibility are reduced to the question of "privacy."
(1984a, 259)

The first part of this passage shows the relativist's
appeal to the priority of the majority's tradition in the
matter. The latter part of the passage shows that
Neuhaus has grasped that his opponent's strategy is to
take the reductionist line and change the topic.
I have treated the absolutist, the relativist, and the
reductionist stances first, because all three have one
trait in common in the public debates about abortion.
Each stance is committed to cutting through public
disagreement in order to have public policy reflect
"the truth" in some sense or another. The absolutist
wants the absolute truth about abortion instantiated in
public policy. The relativist wants his possibly ,absolute,
but publicly relative, truth instantiated. And the reductionist hopes we can all agree on the truth that the
issue must be removed from further public decisionmaking.
The skeptic stance is distinguished from them all in
that it begins by taking persistent, public disagreement
to be a fundamental and significant fact. In my definition skepticism has two key characteristics. One is the
obvious characteristic of recognizing that we do not
know. But there is another feature of skepticism, and
it is too often overlooked. This is the characteristic of
recognizing that there is nevertheless a truth relating to
the disputed issue.
For the skeptic, persistent, public disagreement
about the truth is a significant and troubling matter.
He will argue that public policy must, if at all possible,
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reflect not only that we do not know the truth but also
that there is a truth. The skeptic thinks that we cannot
hope that we are instantiating the truth in our public
policy. But still, he thinks that our policy-making
should somehow strive to reflect respect for the truth
even while we acknowledge that we have not grasped
it.
Some of the ancient skeptics recommended simply
following the tradition of the society, but today's skeptic on the abortion issue has no widely accepted tradition to follow. And, what is more to the point, today's
skeptic has an important role to play in preserving respect for the truth, even while he confesses to not
knowing it.
It is important to recognize that the skeptic is the
one best placed to try to loosen people's hold on the
so-called truths they are trying to make part of public
policy. This is to say that the skeptic, not the relativist,
is best placed to urge tolerance upon all the combatants. Near the end of his life, Wittgenstein wrote in On
Certainty:
611. Where two principles really do meet which cannot be reconciled with one another, then each man declares the other a fool and a heretic.
612. I said I would "combat" the other man,-but
wouldn't I give him reasons? Certainly; but how far do
they go? At the end of reasons comes persuasion. (Think
what happens when missionaries convert natives.) (1969,
8le)
Too many people today act as though "combat" is
always the only option. They act this way because a retreat to "persuasion" spares them from having to come
to terms with rational criticism of their views. True,
often in private life and in missionary activity, "at the
end of reasons comes persuasion," both friendly and
not. But surely something else can come at the end of
reasons, and this is the mutual acknowledgement of
"not knowing" rather than the continued noise of persuasiOn.
Both theoretically and practically, the appropriate
response to the problems created by irreconcilable disputes in the public sphere is a moderate skepticism.
Skepticism is our best practical protection against the
misguided public truths of the absolutists, relativists,
and reductionists.
On the theoretical side moderate skepticism has a lot
of evidence to which it can appeal. Persistent failure to
agree seems to show that we really don't know what
we think we know. To borrow a Rawlsian phrase out
of context, a "veil of ignorance" descends again and
again upon our public debates. Yet it is not outlandish
to propose that, despite our ignorance, there may well
be some definite truth about the matters concerning
which we disagree.
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The absolutists share that assumption, and, as has
been noted, many public relativists are private absolutists. True, the reductionist is committed to saying
that there is no truth at all about the issue, but that
position is hard to maintain in the case of abortion.
For it is difficult to show that it is simply meaningless
publicly to discuss whether and when a fetus comes to
have a right to life.
So in a dispute such as that over abortion, skepticism does not take the implausible reductionist line
that there is no public significance at all to the questions being debated. Skepticism also avoids the relativist's despairing retreat to persuasion and the counting of noses. The skeptic affirms with the absolutist
that there is a truth about the matter, but he does not
go on hoping to make a public case for the truth when
thoughtful people of good will have again and again
reached an impasse in their debates. Theoretically, the
case for skepticism in public debates about abortion
looks promising.
The question of public policy on abortion, however,
raises an important practical challenge to the skeptic.
Society must decide one way or another about regulating the abortion decision. Does the skeptic suggest that
we simply flip a coin? I think not. Instead, skepticism
is not only a theoretically satisfying alternative. It can
also be our best practical guide. It both makes us
cautious and more tolerant and can contribute something substantive to the debates about public policy on
abortion.
Above, I quoted some of Neuhaus' relativist opposition to Roe v. Wade and his allegation that the decision
was based on reductionist reasoning. My skeptic would
approach Roe v. Wade in a way different from
Neuhaus' relativism, though the skeptic might think,
with Neuhaus, that there are reductionist tendencies in
the High Court's reasoning. The skeptic would say
that the majority justices were correct in taking into
account the "veil of ignorance" that has descended
upon contemporary public debate about abortion.
Skeptical reason demands that we confess as they confessed that we cannot
resolve the difficult question of when life begins. When
those trained in the respective disciplines of medicine,
philosophy, and theology are unable to arrive at any
consensus, the judiciary, at this point in the development of man's knowledge, is not in a position to speculate as to the answer.
The justices went on to conclude that where we lack
knowledge it is wrong to legislate. In this they may
have been swayed by a reductionist approach that confuses "not knowing" with "having no public significance."
The Cresset

The skeptic could and should argue for a different
strategy in the face of our not knowing. The skeptic
does agree with the majority justices that we are not
making progress in public debate about the morality
of abortion. The skeptic also agrees that it is wrong arbitrarily to choose one "truth" or the other and to
make it public policy, even if the choice is made by
majority vote.
But the skeptic is wary of letting reductionist truth
sneak in on the admission that we do not have knowledge of the truth about the primary issue. He respectfully declines to force any truth in the absence of compelling public argument. So while withholding judgment on the morality of abortion, my skeptic would
suggest a different strategy in the face of persistent,
public disagreement.
He would try to breach the boundaries between prolife and pro-choice with an argument that seeks to
bring reasoned agreement concerning the following
hypotheticals:
(1) If the pro-life position is the truth and abortions
nevertheless are permitted, then a final and terrible
outrage against life is perpetrated with each abortion of
convenience.
(2) On the other hand, if abortion is not wrong and
abortions nevertheless are prohibited, then there is unnecessary infringement of the freedom of those who are
constrained from having an abortion. There is also the
toll of psychological and physical suffering that will
ensue.
The skeptic is trying to recover some common
ground for reasoned discussion· in public affairs. He
believes that opposite sides in the abortion debate
might be able to agree on the above hypotheticals. If
they could be brought to a common agreement about
these hypotheticals, then the question for shared, public policy would be not who is right and who is wrong,
but rather what risks, under a "veil of ignorance,"
should our society take in balancing individual freedom with prevention of harm to others.
I suggest that people who genuinely anguish over
not finally knowing in a publicly arguable way the
truth about abortion can go some distance together in
common discussion of the comparable weight of the
risks involved. Disagreement would no doubt quickly
arise, but I think the prospects for reasoned discussion
of the disagreements are better when the questions involve what risks to take rather than what "truth" to
adopt.
This is not the place to open debate about relative
risks. I am prepared to do that elsewhere. (In a debate
about relative risks I would initially suspect that, given
our ignorance, it is preferable to risk prohibition of
abortions of convenience than to risk free choice.) My
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argument here has been that a skeptic stance in public
discourse is defensible and gives hope of restoring a
measure of rational discussion to the public square.

I suggest that people who genuinely
anguish over not finally knowing in a
publicly arguable way the truth about
abortion can go some distance together
in common discussion of the comparable
weight of the risks involved on
opposing sides of the issue.
Perhaps it is this possibility of continuing reasoned
public discussion in the face of disagreement that led
Justice White to write the following in his dissenting
opinion on Roe v. Wade:
The Court apparently values the convenience of the
pregnant mother more than the continued existence
and development of the life or potential life which she
carries. Whether or not I might agree with that marshalling of values, I can in no event join the Court's
judgment because I find no constitutional warrant for
imposing such an order of priorities on the people and
legislatures of the States. In a sensitive area such as this,
involving as it does issues over which reasonable men
may easily and heatedly differ, I cannot accept the
Court's exercise of its clear power of choice .... This
issue, for the most part, should be left with the people
and to the political processes the people have devised to
govern their affairs.
Absolutists and relativists would very likely oppose
the proposed skeptic approach, but I do not think
they are in any position to offer sound, public reasons
against it. Absolutism is doomed by the fact of persistent disagreement in the public sphere. Should the absolutist then adopt the relativist strategy? I think not,
for that is a recipe for tyranny of the majority. That
hardly seems a thoughtful person's best choice. I do
not see how a relativist falsehood-free-for-all that leads
to simple majority rule is the sort of process to which
one would want to entrust his future.
Furthermore, this kind of approach has led modern
thought in the direction of a perilous cynicism about
truth. On many sides today are those who claim that
anyone who appeals to "truth" is simply and always
employing a subterfuge designed to disguise his "real"
interest. That said, these same people feel free to pursue without restraint any effective method of furthering their own interests. While I understand the temptation that is there for those who think they have a
majority of the votes to press on with relativist persua-

9

sion, I definitely fear the consequences of the precedent they set by giving in to that temptation.
The reductionist has tried to escape the tyranny of
the majority by arguing that an irresolvable issue like
abortion must be removed from public decision-making. But irresolvable disagreement does not necessarily
mean that an issue has no deep and abiding public significance. The danger is that the reductionist approach appears so implausible in the case of abortion
that thoughtful people are beginning to rally behind a
"majority morality" argument just in order to find an
alternative.
What is wanted is a way to return careful, public
reasoning to the public sphere, even and precisely
where disagreement persists. The skeptical approach
seems more successfully to account for the genuine
significance of public discussion of abortion while it
also protects against the "majority morality" argument.
So I recommend that in our modern retreat from
absolutism we take refuge in skepticism. In the public
sphere I would far rather trust myself to reasoned discussion under a veil of skeptical ignorance than to the
vagaries of relativist majority rule or to the implausibilities of a reductionist ban on further public
decision-making.

III
More room should be made for skepticism in matters political. In public debates we seem best protected
and freed when there is a widespread acceptance of
two propositions--one, that there is genuine truth;
and two, that often none of us can make the public .
case that shows how our truth should become the public's truth. Skeptical, critical reason can argue for both
propositions. Relativism fails because it too soon gives
up on the proposition that there is genuine truth. Reductionism in its turn fails because it argues falsely
that irresolvable disagreement means we must remove
an issue from further public scrutiny.
Our temptation is to keep seeking to get a monopoly
on some kind of truth. We are tempted to make false
claims to knowledge, either through old-fashioned
rationalism, through religious absolutism, or through
relativising all traditions on the way to privileging our
own. Those who are concerned about the authoritarianism and the perverse pluralism that arise
from these responses to critical reason need to focus
their energies not on capturing the truth but on arguing that severe rational limits constrain all of us in
public discussion. In other words they should join the
skeptic in arguing that there is genuine truth and in
fiercely opposing those who seek to crusade in its
name.
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This will bring into existence neither Plato's Kallipolis nor God's kingdom on earth. But I submit that
skeptical reason has been given us to spare us from
both.
Cl
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What I Heard
Trying to lift the
feather of pain
beyond the fluted openings
of our earthly ears
these words one with your
pulse your voice
begin to stir.
Gathering out of our hearts
their ordinary darkness
light as down
delicately they brush
in lines as deep
and airy as the hollow
bones of birds
as integral. A breath
betrays them.
But when we sleep
drifting beside us
lightly they sing.

Kathleen Mullen
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Paul F. Phipps

BEYOND THE BOTTOM LINE
In Defense of the Study of English

Historians, sociologists, and students of popular culture have pointed out to us that a great deal can be
learned about an era by perceiving who its heroes and
heroines are and what they stand for. I would suggest
that an equally interesting and illuminating study can
be made of an era's key figures of speech or its favorite catch-words or phrases.
Some fifteen years ago the word was relevance. College students especially demanded of their professors
that their subjects and courses be "relevant." What they
were to be relevant to was seldom clearly specified, but
in a vague and general way the word meant pertinent
to the social changes that were occurring in America
and elsewhere and especially to the protests against
the war in Vietnam. Sometimes I wish I had those students back again, because although some of them were
troublesome, they were serious students and were
genuinely committed to improving the lives of others.
They readily perceived that the ability to write well
was a useful tool for them, and they were willing to
admit that poets often had been the first to protest
against social injustice.
I am having a harder time dealing with the reigning
catch-phrase of today--I refer of course to the phrase
"the bottom line"--and I feel a great frustration with
the prevalent tendency to measure the value of the
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humanities in general and the study of English language and literature in particular by the standard of
the profit-and-loss statement. I can well understand
and sympathize with the parent of a prospective college student who says, somewhat anxiously, "My son is
interested in majoring in English. Is there any job that
he will be qualified for if he chooses that major?" Indeed, I think there are viable and reassuring answers
to that parent's question.
But I am much less sympathetic toward the attitude
of some students that their courses in English composition and literature are of limited or negligible value
because these courses do not seem to them to be directly and immediately related to their major or special field of study, such as accounting, or mechanical
engineering, or computer science. Such an attitude, of
course, simply mirrors the attitude of many persons
among the general public-an attitude epitomized by
the very phrase "the bottom line."
Purely on a utilitarian basis, I should like to suggest
that "the bottom line" is not always the bottom line.
That is to say, what may be profitable in the short run
may not always be so in the long run. The evidence
is mounting that the young person who is wellgrounded in English and the other humanities, who is
able to write well and speak well, and who has a sensitive perception of human nature (a perception which
I maintain is most assuredly to be derived from the
study of literature) will eventually advance further in
business and the professions than those who merely
possess technical competence in their fields.
Even the casual reader of such business and financial publications as Forbes and Fortune will find evidence that the ability to communicate well and the
ability to motivate other people are abilities highly
prized and much sought after by corporation executives. Not too long ago the president of a leading bank
was asked, according to an article appearing in a
weekly news magazine, what studies he would recommend for young people seeking careers in banking
and finance. In his response this bank president put
11
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English, including both writing and literature, at the
top of his list. Recently a Foreign Service Officer who
visited the Valparaiso University campus to encourage
our students to apply for positions in the Foreign Service stressed the need for people with the ability to
write lucid and coherent reports and to deal sensitively
with people.
These examples could be readily multiplied. In
other words, despite the pervasiveness of the term
"the bottom line" in our current culture, with its connotation of immediate economic benefit, I see encouraging signs that increasing numbers of perceptive
people in business and government are recognizing
and publicly proclaiming the economic value, especially over the longer term, of the study of English
composition and yes--even of literature.
But we who study and teach language and literature
know that the value of these subjects goes far beyond
the utilitarian, far beyond the mere enhancement of
job or career. What we offer is nothing less than the
continual enrichment of the whole life of the human
being, virtually from the cradle to the grave, if I may
borrow another catch phrase from a still earlier era.
The ability to use language with precision and sensitivity is not only of practical value, but it is also a source
of deep personal gratification and an aid to both
thinking and feeling. Indeed, language and its highest
embodiment in story, poem, and play seem to satisfy
a deeply felt need of all human beings, of whatever
era or place on the globe.
Who of us has not observed the sheer delight that
a very small child takes in words and phrases, in their
sounds and their rhythms and even in their very feel.
A small child will several times repeat a word he or
she has just learned, savoring the feel of it on tongue
and lips. If given the opportunity, the child will ex~end this early delight in language to a love of story
and poem. I do not think that the benefits of early exposure to stories and poems can be exaggerated in
terms of developing a child's imagination as well as his
or her language facility.
When I taught the sophomore literature course in
our Directed Studies Program, the predecessor of our
present honors college, I found that my 35 or 40 students came from very diverse geographic, economic,
academic, and family backgrounds. But the one constant in the backgrounds of these very bright and articulate students was that they had all been exposed to
books from their early childhood and had regularly
been read to until they themselves went to school and
learned to read.
Wordsworth, in his autobiographical poem The Prelude, gives his boyhood reading of imaginative children's classics a place second only to the beauty and
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grandeur of nature in the development of his mind
and poetic imagination. In Book V of The Prelude he
speaks of returning home from boarding school for
the holidays, "there to find that golden store of books
which I had left. What joy was mine!" And Coleridge
writes of his great pleasure as a child in reading Robinson Crusoe and the tales of the Arabian Nights and
claims for the poet, for the storyteller, the power to
carry the child's sense of wonder and novelty into
adulthood.

We who study language and literature
know that the value of these subjects
goes far beyond the utilitarian, far
beyond the mere enhancement of job or
career. What we offer is nothing
less than the continual enrichment of
the whole life of the human being.
It seems to me that we as teachers of English must
rededicate ourselves to sustaining and nourishing
through the school years the child's early love of language, of story and poem, and then to convincing our
students to carry into their lives as adults that sense of
wonder and novelty that we have helped them to discover in literature. It is no easy task, of course. We
face the enticing competition of television, of sports,
and of video-cassettes, as well as the tyranny of the
bottom line. But the broadening of one's vision, the
sharpening of one's sensitivities, and the deepening of
one's compassion as a human being which literature
provide-these make the task eminently worthwhile.
As educators and particularly as teachers of language and literature we are confronted presently by
several formidable challenges. One, of course, is the
threat of diminishing funds. We are all aware of the
immense Federal budget deficit and the need to reduce it in every prudent way. But is it not imprudent
to cut funds for education at a time when society is demanding even more services from schools and colleges? For instance, the recent passage of the immigration bill will surely mean that thousands of new Americans will need to be assimilated and that assimilation
will in turn mean becoming proficient in English, requiring, I would suppose, many more programs in
and teachers of English as a second language. The real
bottom line is that the money our federal government
devotes to education should be regarded as an investment, not as a readily reducible expense.
I am not opposed to our country's having a strong
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national defense, but I do expect as a taxpayer that
my defense dollars will be well spent. Several months
ago the Wall Street journal reported that one of the
country's largest defense contractors had included as
an expense item in a cost-plus contract a ·very large
sum that had been spent for country club and private
club memberships for its senior executives. I very
roughly calculated that this sum was sufficient to provide about 100 books for every school and public library in the city where this contractor is headquartered. Busy as we are, we educators must take time to
let our representatives in Congress know that we are
strongly opposed to cutting funds from vital education
budgets that can much more judiciously be cut elsewhere.
Another formidable challenge directly affecting
teachers of English is the recent emergence--again-of
the censorship of books, including a number of
acknowledged literary classics. No matter how sincere
the individuals or groups may be who are objecting to
various literary works, one has to conclude that their
objections are based upon a deplorable lack of understanding of the purpose and function of literature, including literature for children and young adults.
As I have said earlier, one of the main functions of
literature is to broaden our understanding of human
nature and to deepen and enrich our experience of
life. The life experience of any one person is limited
by time, place, and circumstances. But through imaginative literature one can vicariously experience many
other facets of life and become a more sensitive, more
compassionate, more tolerant person. If students are
to be strictly limited in their reading only to those
books that portray the life they already know and be
exposed only to those opinions they or their parents
already espouse, then their growth and development
as human beings will be severely stunted.
I myself am hoping that the higher courts will overturn decisions that have already been rendered in
Tennessee and elsewhere, and that in other cases that
have not yet come to trial , a wiser and more humane
view will prevail. It may well be necessary for us as
teachers of English to speak out on this issue through
our associations such as the National Council of
Teachers of English, and where possible act individually as expert witnesses. And of course we must strive
ceaselessly within the classroom and outside of it to develop in our fellow citizens a truer and more sophisticated understanding of literature than the one possessed by the would-be censors.
Yet despite these formidable challenges confronting
us and the perplexing problems we face, I am not at
all pessimistic. For there are encouraging signs on the
horizon, and favorable events are already taking place.
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The enlightened business and professional leaders
who value the subjects we teach and who are willing
to support us are increasing in number. Knowledgeable legislators at both the state and federal level are
beginning to insist that adequate funds for educational
programs and yes-for improved teachers' salariesmust be provided.
The entrance of greater numbers of women, including former teachers, into the fields of law, advertising,
marketing, and investment banking puts pressure on
the public and their representatives in legislatures and
on school boards to increase teachers' salaries. (As far
as the bottom line is concerned, teachers, too, have a
right to be well compensated for their work.) Such
concepts as merit raises, career ladders, and distinguished teaching awards are spreading and will enhance the profession.
Then, too, there are the very real and enduring personal satisfactions we derive from our work: the feeling of exhilaration one has upon reading a surprisingly good essay written by a student with whom one
has patiently worked for weeks; noting the excitement
over a poem in the eyes of a student athlete who
thought he hated poetry; and of course the gratification of having a particularly talented student decide
that he or she wishes to become an English teacher.
So don't sell short your stock in the profession.
These are good times, these are exciting times, to be
a teacher of English.
Cl

Are You Married Yet?
Returning from seeing you
I think of bordershow the Niagara River,
bridged,
asks questions of my passing
and how the bus travels
with sweet, slick smells.
My restless hands
search the overhead rack,
beneath the seat,
in my purse, in my pockets.
I know I have forgotten something.
Surely I have forgotten something.

Margot Cullen
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Deborah Skopek Schumacher

THOUGHTS ON "WRONGFUL LIFE"
Reflections on Law and American Values

A copy of a recent judicial opinion caught my attention as it lay in my "in" box and continues to hold it.
It is a Nevada Supreme Court opinion and it begins:
This case arises out of a claimed failure of surgical
sterilization and the delivery by Phyllis Szekeres of a
normal baby girl, Erica. Phyllis sues on her own behalf
and on behalf of Erica and Erica's brothers and sisters
claiming that all have been "damaged" by the birth of
Erica.'
Erica's family sued the surgeons performing the operation and the hospital where the operation occurred to
recover the costs of Erica's birth and rearing.
My immediate reaction to the Szekeres' suit was to
protest to the nearest human being, my secretary, who
is a loving mother. Interrupting her, I exclaimed how
horrible it was for the girl to grow up in a family that
publicly proclaimed her unwanted and sought money
for the "damage" her very life caused them. "How
horrible!" She agreed.
"Wrongful life" claims arising from the birth of a
profoundly retarded or abnormal child are well-publicized. Until reading this opinion, I did not know that
the term "wrongful life" could embrace a healthy but
unwanted birth.
I don't doubt that Phyllis Szekeres was angry, resentful, perhaps fearful, when she learned that she
was pregnant. With three children present already,
Erica probably strains the family budget beyond breaking. Perhaps it is her parents' nerves that she strains.
Maybe childbearing is dangerous for Phyllis Szekeres.
Whatever the source, there is no reason to question
the sincerity of her anguish.

To put my cards on the table plainly, let me say that
I strongly believe that "pro-choice" should be the law
of the land. I also believe that condemning birth control is degrading to women and men. I also confess
that I am not a mother, and I know that I would be
overwhelmed by four youngsters.
Still-this lawsuit offends me. I am disturbed by the
idea that the birth of a healthy baby is a wrong. Surely
applauding control over reproduction does not compel
accepting an unwanted birth as a wrongful life.

"Wrongful life" claims arising from
the birth of a profoundly retarded or
abnormal child are well-publicized.
Until I read this opinion, I did not
know that the term could embrace
a healthy but unwanted birth.
Although the Szekeres were unsuccessful litigants,
other similarly situated parents have prevailed. This
issue is one of state law which different states have resolved differently. The compensation awarded parents
has ranged from expenses of pregnancy and childbirth
only, to the full cost (including emotional toll) of birth
and childbearing, to an intermediate award that attempts to balance what a child "costs" versus what he
or she is "worth." 2
Please bear with a short and shallow digression into
law to help me make my point. Generally, a complaint
initiating a lawsuit that is not based on either a con'Szekeres v. Robinson, 102 Nev. Adv. Opinion No. 23.
See e.g., Wilbur v. Kerr, 628 S.W.2d 568 (Ark. 1982) (al-
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covery for all economic and emotional costs and attributable to the birth and recovery of the unwanted child); and
Troppi v. Scarf, 187 N.W.2d 511 (Mich. App. 1971) (attempts to balance the child's "cost" against his or her
"worth").
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tract between the parties or a statute must allege a
"wrong" that is legally compensable. Most states, for
instance, do not allow a wife to bring a rape claim
against her husband, however much the intercourse
was against her will. This refusal is based on public
policy which probably includes both sexism and a
pragmatic fear that hearing these claims will involve
courts uncomfortably in couples' intimate lives.
It is a commonplace and common sense that our law
informs us about ourselves. Although courts occasionally are out of step with public opinion, such as in the
civil rights area during the 1950s and 60s, more often
than not judicial decisions manifest and reinforce
popular values. The civil wrongs that we recognize in
our law express our values.
This is what keeps the Szekeres v. Robinson case in my
thoughts. I do not want to believe that our society is
so unwelcoming to children that a normal but unplanned birth is an injury to the parents or siblings that
justice requires redressing. In addition, I doubt that
the ties that bind families and the intricate give and
take of a lifetime can be reduced to a calculation of
what a family member "costs" balanced against his or
her "worth." Such an accounting is impossible and the
attempt is arrogant.
In discussing the Roman Catholic position on birth
control, Father James Burtchaell has written that family planning is not itself theologically wrong, but that
a couple should be able to answer for the "purpose
and outcome and generosity" of their openness to children over the course of their marriage.' I do not share
Father Burtchaell's belief that Christianity mandates
parenthood for couples, but I do share his conviction
that we should be accountable, individually and socially, for the direction and generosity of our lives.
The court opinion in Szekeres v. Robinson gives us no
insight into the Szekeres' situation beyond what I have
sketched above. I do not mean to imply that the Szekeres or any particular family "should" be blissful at
the thought of another baby, whatever the personal
circumstances or cost. Real life just isn't that way.
These families deserve compassion.
I hope, however, that the birth of a healthy baby
will be welcomed as a social and legal norm, with
generosity, openness, and positive expectations. The
value of a human life is larger than a couple's attitude
toward a child's birth, even when they are that child's
parents. As a matter of public policy, we should not
foster the attitude that a healthy birth is a "wrong" by
Cl
recognizing it in our law.

Quidditas
The radiance ... the quidditas,
the whatness of a thing . . .
Stephen Dedalus,
A Portrait of the Artist
as a Young Man
Look at it, this peony
Nodding its pink, heavy head
Out of a line of nodding,
Of yeses, of droops of scent.
Touch it. Notice its tissues,
Each one a frill.
Like something chopped openA small flower cabbage
Bloomingly exposed.
And, once you've seen it,
A peony, not the word
But what chills the word
Into meaning, look at this roomThe painting, the books,
The tired, embroidered chairsAnd know it, not as a place
To walk through or stand in
Or lean toward.
Let the bulbs be shrill
And then half cover them.
Let us have those hooded night beams.
And then look at me.
See me. The day I soft-shoed
Through the leaves, I walked through
The soft-shoed leaves.
There was no difference.
And the sun fell.
Oh, the cathedral light on the leaves,
The thousands of moving leaves,
Leaves like circles,
Like bunches of yellow grapes,
Ridged and slivered, and the sun down.
Like something chopped open.
The light. I see you,
The radiance of this small room.

Kim Bridgford

'James Tunstead Burtchaell, "For Better, For Worse," in
James Tunstead Burtchaell, ed., Marriage Among Christians
(Notre Dame, IN: Ave Maria Press, 1977), pp. 38-39.
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The Return
of Quasimodo
Richard Maxwell
Goethe hated Victor Hugo's
Notre-Dame de Paris. He told the
friend who sent him a copy that he,
Goethe, had tried all his life to cultivate a natural sense, a judgment
based on Nature. He was not willing to corrupt himself with literature that mixed the beautiful and
the ugly. Goethe used this argument more than once (for example,
he criticized Kleist with much the
same words). He was old, cranky,
dismissive of the young-and yet,
he had a point.
Dwelling on the impossible and
the unbearable-as the tottering
sage of Weimar put it-books like
Notre-Dame produce a "strange
realism," strange, I think, in that it
alters one's sense of the real. The
tale of Quasimodo and his friends
contains no supernatural incidents;
all the same, it has seemed to many
readers of this extravagant volume
that it opens up worlds of morbidity at an alarming rate. By the time
we enter the charnel-house of
Montfaucon to discover the hunchback's corpse clutching that of Esmeralda the gypsy, Hugo seems to
have summed up the spirit of his

Richard Maxwell teaches English at
Valparaiso University and writes regularly on Film for The Cresset.
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book.
No doubt is left in our minds
that the beautiful and the ugly
have finally embraced, nor that this
embrace is inextricable. Could
Goethe have been practising a little
deception when he claimed that he
was above finishing Hugo's novel?
Or did he just see where things
were going and prudently stop?
Let us pass lightly over the process by which Notre-Dame became a
children's classic: it was a common
custom in the nineteenth and the
early twentieth centuries to relegate
sado-masochistic fantasies to the
nursery, where perhaps they really
did belong. (Cf. the odd literary
fate of The Arabian Nights.) At all
events Notre-Dame survived in the
popular imagination, so that when
movies took over some of the functions previously performed by
novels and theater, Quasimodo's
career was prime cinematic material.
There were early French versions
in 1906 and 1911. The first American version (The Darling of Paris,
1917) must have been a vehicle for its Esmeralda, Theda Bara.
So far as I know, Lon Chaney's
1923 production established the
tradition of bravura hunchbacks.
Sixteen years later came the magnificent film directed by William
Dieterle and starring Charles
Laughton as Quasimodo.
Almost everyone of a certain age
will remember a few moments
from this extraordinary work:
Gringoire blundering into the
Court of Miracles, where lepers
and cripples swarm over him and
demand that he pick the pocket of
a hanging dummy; Quasimodo
swinging down from the cathedral
towers on a handy rope, plucking
Esmeralda from the scaffold, and
swinging up again; the priest-alchemist Frollo (Cedric Hardwicke)
staring at Esmeralda (Maureen
O'Hara) in frozen lust.
No subsequent Notre-Dame can

match Dieterle's, but Hugo's tale
has continued to be influential. We
have had innumerable Phantoms of
the Opera (all drawn from a 1911
novel obviously modelled on the
adventures of Quasimodo); we
have had King Kong (which cites
Perrault's "Beauty and the Beast,"
also a Hugo favorite, as its inspiration); we have had any number of
melancholy monsters hopelessly in
love
with
infinitely desirable
maidens; we have even had Sally
Cruikshank's bizarre Quasi cartoons.
The tradition often thins out, losing its connection with Notre-Dame.
Almost all of the memorable
beauty-and-the-beast films
owe
something to Hugo, however; the
ch.1e to this connection is usually a
broadening of context, whereby the
monster's love for the maiden is
clarified, distorted, or somehow
mediated through the presence of
a huge building.
In Notre-Dame the building is the
cathedral; in The Phantom of the
Opera it is the Paris Opera House,
a monument almost as crucial to
nineteenth-century Paris as NotreDame to the medieval city; in Kong
it is first a cathedral-like cave on
the cliffs of a prehistoric world and
then, after Kong's removal to New
York, the Empire State Building.
Most recently it is the shadowy and
seemingly infinite loft (presumably
in New York) where Jeff Goldblum
accidently becomes The Fly.
People who didn't see the 1986
Fly may remember its 1958 predecessor. Here a scientist experimenting with a machine something
like the beam-me-up device of Star
Trek manages to get into the transport chamber with a fly. After he
has been transported, the fly has
his body and he the fly's head.
An associate on whom this first
Fly had a forming influence tells
me that the movie follows the adventures of both hybrids. Eventually the wife of the scientist-fly is
The Cresset

forced to defend herself by smashing her husband's disgusting head
in a drill-press; at her trial the flyscientist is hovering around buzzing
"help me!" whereupon the judge
inadvertently smashes him. This
material is silly by any standard except, perhaps, that of an impressionable pre-adolescent male.
David Cronenberg, director of
the new Fly, tries for a different atmosphere. Seth Brundle, the scientist (played by Jeff Goldblum, in a
universally-praised performance), is
a shy but attractive genius, working
virtually by himself on the fabled
transport
machine.
Veronica
(Geena Davis) , an ambitious journalist, discovers his secret. Convinced that she is on to a story
that could make her career (careers
are very important in this yuppie
milieu), she starts spending all her
time with Brundle, recording his
every move. Soon she is sleeping
with him. A hot love a fair develops, so that by the time Brundle
decides to send himself through
the machine the movie has worked
up a spirit of obsessive, indeed
claustrophobic, eroticism.
After Brundle has been transported he still looks human, but his
genes have been synthesized with a
fly's. During the remainder of the
film, his human form gradually
breaks down. He turns into a
genuinely
monstrous
hybrid,
Brundlefly . . . not recognizably
anything. After weeks of climbing
the walls and watching various organs drop off his body (he stores
them in the medicine cabinet) while
his flesh becomes a kind of sticky,
hairy pudding, he finally lets loose.
He wants to use the transport device to merge himself with Veronica and the child that he has conceived. This last experiment goes
awry. He becomes more monstrous
than ever, blending into a piece of
the machinery he originally designed instead of with his beloved.
He asks Veronica to shoot him; reMarch, 1987

luctantly, .she complies. We never
find out what happens to the child
she is carrying.
In my opinion this is not a great
film to take your girlfriend to. Nor
am I the first to voice such a judgment. Most of the people who
wrote about The Fly agreed that it
was effective on its own terms.
Many choose to question its terms,
much as Goethe questioned Hugo's
in Notre-Dame.

There remains a clear
gap between the conduct
of sticky, segmented,
ruthless invertebrates
and the conduct of
human beings (at least
some human beings).
The case against the movie was
put with particular eloquence by
Pauline Kael. Kael has made a
lifelong point of not being a highculture snob. She professes to love
Brian DePalma's films, most of
them anyway. For her, "trash" and
"ga-ga stupidity" have often been
words of praise. The Fly, however,
left her cold. If the movie "has a
power, it's simply in our somewhat
prurient fixation on watching a
man rot until finally he's pleading
for a coup de grace." (The New
Yorker, 6 October 1986) To put the
point another way, The Fly "is extremely literal-minded about physical decay"-as though someone
were to rewrite Kafka's "Metamorphosis" by carefully eliminating its
allegorical dimension, leaving us
with the spectacle of a big, vulnerable bug that eventually dies.
Kael is right to identify this question of subject as central to our
evaluation of the movie. Those who
praised The Fly tried to say what it
was about. Without exception, so
far as I know, they chose to focus

on specific body processes. Apparently Cronenberg's father had recently died of cancer when he
made the film. The Fly was therefore a movie about cancer. Other
viewers connected it with AIDS,
and others yet with puberty (which
makes poor Brundle's experience a
grim farce indeed!)
Such explanations seem vaguely
right. None of them · is completely
convincing. After all the sickness
theories have been laid out, The Fly
still seems to have an interest in ugliness for its own sake. If we tried
to make Brundlefly's dilemma into
an allegory of cancer, puberty, or
AIDS, I think we would have to
end by agreeing with Kael: the
movie has "no real vision-nothing
that lifts it out of the horror-shock
category."
Several scenes, however, suggest
another approach to The Fly's seeming literalness. During one of Veronica's last visits to Brundlefly's laboratory-loft, he tells her that she
should not come back. She is hesitant to take this advice; horrified at
his unfolding transformation, she
nonetheless wishes to go on seeing
him. The reason she should not
come back, he continues, is that insects have no politics. This statement is clear enough even if Veronica doesn't quite get the point.
Brundlefly means to suggest that
no element of compromise or coop~
eration is possible for the sort of
creature he is rapidly becoming. In
one sense he is quite wrong, as
demonstrated by Edward Wilson's
The Insect Societies, among other volumes. Nonetheless, there remains a
traceable gap between the conduct
of sticky, segmented, ruthless invertebrates and the conduct of human
beings (at least some human beings). Brundlefly insists on the existence of this gap. Who should
know better than he, stranded between the two worlds?
His conversation with Veronica is
a turning-point, where Cronenberg
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tips his hand; looking either backwards or forwards, we can apply its
thesis without much difficulty. For
example, soon after Brundle has
become Brundlefly (though well
before he realizes what has happened) he develops enormous
strength. He can swing around
through the loft with superhuman-or subhuman-agility.

Brundlefly feels that he
is on the verge of a
glorious transformation
in which flesh (not just
sex but flesh) will
become both the object
and the means of worship.

Veronica spies on him, sexually
excited by his powers. Soon, however, she proves unable to keep up.
He raves that going through the
transport machine must somehow
have purified him; he feels that he
is on the verge of a glorious transformation in which flesh (not just
sex but flesh) will become both the
object and the means of worship.
Kael notes of Brundle and Veronica that "they look as if they
could produce a race of giants";
"they're like Wagnerian superlovers."
This is Brundle's perception; he
wants his mate to be purified along
with him so that they can rule the
world, etc. Cronenberg does not
expect us to sympathize. Fleshwithout-politics is almost a definition of Brundlefly's condition, his
fly-ness. And after a while we don't
admire it much.
Assertions
of
will-throughstrength are invariably repulsive in
The Fly. Arm-wrestling with a sexual rival, Brundlefly breaks his
arm: we hear the bone crack, then
see it rip through the skin, along
with bloody muscle-fiber. Defending himself against another sexual
18

rival, Brundlefly (by this time
thoroughly aware of all his
metamorphosis entails) vomits on
the hand, then on the foot of his
opponent: the (presumably) acidic
juices eat away flesh, then bone.
Brundlefly takes a certain joy in his
own destructiveness; more intriguing is the suggestion of automatic behavior, to which no human
moral categories could apply. Insects have no politics; insects are
flesh-pure flesh.
In Notre-Dame, Hugo assures us
that Quasimodo's deformity gains
value within the articulating space
of the cathedral. Gothic architecture not only makes his misshapen
body aesthetically explicable, it also
provides him with kinds of power
vouchsafed no other Parisian. He
speaks through the bells (becoming
the voice of a city); he defends Esmeralda from a stone fastness
which he seems, by his wiles, to animate-and which thus provides
him with superhuman strength.
In fact, though Quasimodo appears an outcast, he actually lives at
the heart of Gothic culture; in a
peculiar way he is its prime beneficiary. When the city finally starts
to self-destruct, in a war of classes
which anticipates the French Revolution, it is Quasimodo's tragedy
which Hugo emphasizes-no wonder, since by this time the hunchback practically is the middle
ages.
Notre-Dame is horrifying in an
avant-garde romantic mode, yet
also exceedingly conservative: an
ode of praise to a lost culture
which claimed to cure the ills of
physical existence by establishing
for them a context of theocratic authority. Something of this comes
through in most son-of-Quasimodo
films, if in no other way than
through the focus on architecture;
all the same, The Fly is the first
beauty-and-the-beast
movie
to
bring to the foreground Hugo's obsession with relations between flesh

and civilization.
Cronenberg's
neatest
twistthough working at the far end of
the tradition he may not know itis to turn Notre-Dame's argument
upside-down. No matter how many
times Brundlefly moves (stickily)
across the ceiling of his loft, he remains incapable of considered action. He snatches Veronica from a
doctor about to perform an abortion on her, as Quasimodo
snatched Esmeralda from the inquisitors, but then all he can think
of is merging with her; bringing
her into a family where social links
would be replaced by anatomical
ones. Brundlefly thinks very literally indeed.
The Fly, on the other hand, is distinguished less by literalness than
by its assumption that politics is
useful: that it could, perhaps, do
for our own world what Hugo
thought the cathedral did for the
middle ages. Cronenberg has coordinated a sermon against the flesh
with a fairly optimistic preachment
on human (as opposed to insect)
nature. I am not quite sure how
prominent he means this double insistence to be; nonetheless, I look
forward-shall we say, with reservations-to attending his next film.

••
••

Epiphany
Heaven is ordinary
as a George Herbert poem,
or these narcissi
rising like destiny
from underwater buds
in a bowl of water
on this windowsill.

Sister Maura
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Simonizing a
Memory
John Steven Paul
"Neil Simon's Best Play," trumpets Time magazine's cover. That's
not just publicity; nobody buys
Time. That's news! And everybody
better get over to see Broadway
Bound, because if it's Simon's best,
it's better than . . . what? . . .
Brighton Beach Memoirs! No, better
than that: better than Plaza Suite!
No, better than that: better than
The Odd Couple! The play that starred Jack Klugman and Tony Randall!
Wait a minute. The Odd Couple
didn't star Jack and Tony, it was
Walter Matthau and Jack Lemmon.
Half right: Walter did create the
role of Oscar Madison for the
theatre, but Jack didn't play Felix
Ungar in the original production,
only in the movie. But the fact that
Jack and Tony come first to most
people's minds indicates why we
are suspicious of Neil Simon's
BEST.
Neil Simon's plays sound like
TV. Even his movie dialogue
sounds like really good TV. Yet, although Simon began his career
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wntmg for television, one cannot
rightfully label him as a "TV writer." His scripts have been significant parts of recent theatre and
film history. And it is not Simon's
fault that for the past twenty years
television comedy writers have
emulated his style of domestic comedy. But the proliferation of domestic, situation comedy, its ready
availability, has made it common,
not to say trivial. Live theatre, on
the other hand, has never been
available enough to be common.
Theatre is special. So why go to the
theatre to see something that is
commonly available on TV? And,
conversely, why is Neil Simon
celebrated for trivializing the
theatre?
Simon once said that his goal was
to keep an audience laughing
throughout a show and to make
them cry at the end. (How about
that for naked emotional manipulation!) His chief device for accomplishing that goal has always
been character. Simon's principal
characters are usually middle-class
professionals or businessmen. More
often male than female. (Though
Simon tried to make up for that in
a big way recently by re-writing the
famed Odd Couple for two women
principals.) They possess intelligence, self-awareness, and, most
important, a disarming and often
self-deprecating sense of humormanifest in the classic Neil Simon
one-liner.
Simon's plays, like all drama, are
based on conflicts between heroes
and antagonists. The difference between comedy and tragedy, you
might say, is that at the moment of
truth, tragic heroes meet their antagonists head on and die and
comic heroes circumvent their antagonists and live with (some degree of) happiness (for some length
of time) afterward. Through poetic
history the comic hero has outwitted his antagonist, spouting his
witty language along the way.

Simon's character deploys his sense
of humor in a slightly different
way.
Simon's comic hero uses his sense
of humor to put ironic distance between himself and his trouble. As
long as the hero can objectify and
say, in effect, "if, in this situation I
look so ridiculous, how could I be
tragic," he wins. The audience
laughs with glee at the hero's victory over his antagonist. When the
character's sense of enormity of his
trouble overwhelms him and neutralizes his sense of humor, he is
pitiable and the audience cries.
When the character makes smiling
peace with his trouble, the audience sighs in cathartic relief. Thus
the Simon character struggles as
much with his own ability to maintain his equilibrium as he does with
any antagonist. He constantly asks
himself Mayor Koch's question:
"How'm I doin'?"
The comic hero's effort to regain his lost equilibrium after it has
been upset sets in motion what aesthetician Suzanne Langer calls "the
comic rhythm." It is a survival response natural to all life forms.
Most of Simon's heroes (who might
more appropriately be called "antiheroes") inhabit the environment
known as New York City. Here, life
is complicated and hassled to the
extent that equilibrium, if it exists,
is extremely fragile. The typical
New Yorker, shall we call him
"Everyman," spends much of his
life getting his balance.
If Neil Simon didn't invent this
wry, self-deprecating urban tightrope-walker, he certainly perfected
him during the late Sixties and
early Seventies. The typical Simon
script of that period traced a character's repeated self-rescues from
the edge of an emotional cataclysm
by the hook of a sharp one-liner.
And Neil Simon became the most
financially successful playwright in
history.
TV writers were quick to copy
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the Simon model, partly because of
its huge commercial success, but
also, no doubt, because the character seemed right for a culture in
which stress was becoming the
American TV watcher's most recognizable villain. For the past
twenty years, a stream of hassled
businessmen,
anxiously
aging
housewives,
minority entrepreneurs, divorced mothers of teenagers, military medics, and smartmouthed children of all sizes, colors, and ages have appeared on
our TV screens. Their appeal lay
in their ability to handle everything
their antagomstJc circumstances
dished out to them, and to get off
more than a few good jokes while
doing so.
It is with this baggage that one
goes to New York's Broadhurst
Theatre to see Broadway Bound,
doubting that it will be a very satisfying evening. But it is. Linda
Lavin and John Randolph give outstanding performances as the
mother and the grandfather and
the entire cast is fine . Designer
David Mitchell puts an appropriately surrealistic frame around
his solidly realistic two-story house.
And Simon has explored, what is
for him, new emotional territory.
The play is the third in an autobiographical series that begins
~ith Brighton Beach Memoirs (now
also a feature film) and includes
Biloxi Blues. In Broadway Bound,
Simon's persona, Eugene Morris
Jerome, has returned from his military service to his family home at
1427 Pulaski Street, Brighton
Beach, Brooklyn, New York. Here
also dwell Eugene's mother Kate,
the bedrock of the household, a
tireless wife, mother, homemaker,
and guardian of the family tradition and respectability; his father
Jack, who has worked a lifetime to
achieve modest success as a garment cutter; his grandfather Ben, a
crusty old Trotskyite socialist; and
his older brother Stanley.
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Light and dark plot lines intersect throughout the play. The happier one traces the launching of the
comedy writing team of Jerome
and Jerome. Stanley, the hustler of
the pair, spends much of his time
making and schmoozing contacts.
By the end of the play, the
brothers have progressed from an
audition sketch for CBS, to a national radio network premier for
one of their scripts, to a job writing
for the Phil Silvers television show.

It is with certain
baggage that one goes to
New York's Broadhurst
Theatre to see Neil
Simon's Broadway Bound.
The darker plot is laced with
doses of nostalgia, melancholy, and
pain. After thirty-three years of
marriage, Jack and Kate Jerome's
marriage is foundering. Jack has
found another woman more interesting than his wife. He moves
out of the Brighton Beach house.
The Jeromes' break-up takes its
place in a series of separations in
the family's history. Kate's father is
separated from his wife, who now
lives alone in Florida. Kate's sister
was widowed and then married a
man with whom the family has
never become close. Later the
Jerome brothers themselves leave
to take up residence in Manhattan.
"Life," as Linda Loman said to
Willy, "is a casting off."
So, as one part of the Jerome
family ascends the stairs in its pursuit of happiness, it meets another
descending. They pass in the memory of Eugene Morris Jerome, a!k/a
Neil Simon. With Broadway Bound,
even more than the earlier plays,
Simon has written a memory play.
Eugene O'Neill, Clifford Odets,
and Tennessee Williams have all
written memory plays that have be-

come standards of the American
repertory. For O'Neill, Ah, Wilderness! and Long Day's Journey Into
Night are opposite sides of the emo.tional com. (The choice of
"Eugene" as the name for Simon's
own character in the trilogy is a tribute to O'Neill, whom Simon much
admired.)
Ah, Wilderness! is light romance in
which O'Neill's young Richard Mil~
ler suffers the adolescent agonies
of first love and struggles for understanding and respect from his
father and mother, Nat and Essie
Miller. Long Day's journey is arguably the most emotionally wrenching drama ever written by an
American. Here O'Neill, as the
tubercular Edmund Tyrone, remembers his mother's descent into
morphine-induced oblivion, as he,
his alcoholic brother, and his aging,
self-loathing father look helplessly,
hopelessly on.
In 1935, Clifford Odets' memory
play, Awake and Sing, boosted the
famed Group Theatre to prominence. Neil Simon's indebtedness to
this Depression-era drama is clear.
Odets' Bergers live in the Bronx;
like the Jeromes, they are Jews.
Mother Bessie Berger rules the
roost, ordering her husband about
and invoking the incontrovertible
law of respectibility to thwart the
initiatives of young Ralph and his
sister Hennie. Bessie's aged father
Jacob occupies a room in the
Berger flat. Like Ben of Broadway
Bound, Jacob is a doctrinaire
socialist. When Bessie discovers that
her unmarried daughter is pregnant by a stranger, she hastily arranges a marriage for the girl to a
timorous recent immigrant whom
Hennie detests.
Bessie's tyranny so depresses her
father that he commits suicide in
order to leave the proceeds of a life
insurance policy to Ralph, his best
hope. But, in the name of the family's survival, Bessie forces Ralph to
give up the money. When Hennie
The Cresset

has the opportunity to run away
with a man she loves, her brother
urges her to leave her poor husband and their baby behind. When
she does so, Ralph also pledges to
free himself from the oppressive
household.
Like Eugene Jerome, Tennessee
Williams' Tom Wingfield openly
narrates his story, terming it a
"memory play." Of the four earlier
plays, The Glass Menagerie is probably the best known. Another matriarch, Amanda, and a sister this
time, Laura, are the other characters in this recollection of the playwright's claustrophobic existence in
a St. Louis flat. The main action is
the visit of the gentleman caller
and his premature departure: a
flame of hope in the Wingfield's
desolate lives and its extinction.
Williams constructed his plot,
character, and dialogue realistically,
but he employed anti-illusionistic
devices to convey the ephemeral
quality of the memory. Music from
unidentified sources underlay some
of the dialogue, mysterious light illuminated parts of the set, printed
legends were projected, and walls
suddenly became translucent and
then invisible. The walls in the
Jeromes' otherwise very solid house
on Pulaski Avenue are similarly
translucent. At the close of Broadway Bound, Eugene puts us in mind
of Tom as he stands outside looking through the walls of the house
at his mother, now bereft, polishing
what was once the family table.
Neil Simon's new play shares not
only a few formal details with the
earlier plays, but membership in
the memory-play genre with certain
identifiable characteristics. The materials a playwright uses to build a
memory play are those scattered
moments that have been locked
into his consciousness and are accessible with the key of a visual or
aural image. The logic of memory
is not that of chronological sequence, but of relative intensity.
March, 1987

Neil Simon, and O'Neill, Odets,
and Williams before him, have located their most intense moments
in adolescence while living with
mothers, fathers, sisters, brothers,
grandparents, and other family
members. The events happened in
a time when the consciousness was
forming, receptive, vulnerable, and
connected with people who, by
their sustained presence and elemental importance, were especially
able to make a mark on the memory.
The memory playwright focuses
on times of transition, of departure, of movement from one geographical place, or state of mind,
or dynamic of circumstances to
another. Eugene Jerome is moving
to New York-"not to Budapest,"
as Stanley assures their motherbut, in effect, the distance is as
great. Moreover, the Brighton
Beach world, the world where
Eugene's mother and father were
happily married, had moved on
anyway. That world had departed,
leaving the young man to make
sense of a new situation.
Near the end of Broadway Bound
Eugene convinces his mother, Kate,
to tell a memory of her own. She
was working as a dancer at the

Primrose Ballroom, and one night
the young matinee idol George
Raft came to the room. (As Kate,
Linda Lavin made this speech into
a virtuoso turn for herself.) Reluctantly at first, Kate begins to describe her feelings, moment by moment. It was the most memorable
dance of her life. Enveloped in
memory, she is now eager, now
anxious, now confident, now
proud, indifferent, thrilled, fulfilled. She is moved to illustrate the
story with a step or two. Eugene listens intently. The loving son is
pleased to see his mother engrossed in happy thoughts, and, just as
important, the aspiring writer is ingesting the story for his own use.
Neil Simon reveals this purpose
in a particularly fine moment from
Broadway Bound. The Jerome family
gathers around the radio console to
listen to the first network program
to feature one of the boys' scripts.
In the script, a rustic out-of-towner
comes to New York and visits with
a family very much like the
Jeromes in a neighborhood very
much like Brighton Beach. The
humor stems from the confrontation of the stranger with "the natives" and his startled reactions to
their "folkways." The radio script is
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a hit with the listening audience,
but Jack Jerome accuses his sons of
ridiculing their own family. Stanley
defends himself, insisting that they
could have been writing about anybody. Eugene, however, confirms
to his brother that he was writing
about his mom, dad, and grandpa.
Kate Jerome's memory of her
dance with George Raft is similar,
in kind, to Amanda Wingfield's
nostalgic memory of her days as a
belle in Blue Mountain, to Nat and
Essie Miller's sentimental memories
of their happy courtship, and to
the agonized memories of James
and Mary Tyrone. All these plays
are layered memories: memories
about memories, memories within
memories. In allowing his characters to relive their recollected
stories on stage, the playwright
links his own memory to those of
his parents. Writing a memory play
is a familial act. With the play, the
writer secures his own place, for
better or worse, in the line of descent from his forebears to himself.
Just before Jack's departure from
the house for good, he has a
heated argument with his son,
Stanley. Jack condemns Stanley for
violating the sacred privacy of the
family for comic purposes. Stanley
looks contemptuously at his father.
Full of hatred for him for turning
away from his mother and to
another woman, he spits, "Go to
Hell!" Jack is momentarily stunned,
but then resigned to a new reality.
He responds: "Either you've grown
up too fast, or I've outlived my
place in this house. " Both developments are true. The scene is reminiscent of Death of a Salesman, and
it was Arthur Miller who wrote that
the tragic feeling is evoked when
we are in the presence of a character who fears displacement to such
an extent that he is willing to
lay down his life to secure that
place.
Nearly forty years after his departure from Brighton Beach, it is,
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evidently, important for Neil Simon
to secure his place there. But
Broadway Bound is not a tragedy.
Jack does not lay down his life; he
leaves Brooklyn, is divorced from
Kate, and later marries "a very nice
woman." Gene Jerome/Neil Simon
went on to a unprecedentedly successful career writing comedy. His
comedy has some deeply poignant
and painful moments, but it still
evokes many more laughs than
tears; we are always pulled back
from the brink, saved by a sense of
humor.
Several years before the premier
of the present play, Professor Ruby
Cohn wrote a study of American
dramatists from 1960-1980. Cohn
entitled the chapter in which she
discussed the plays of Neil Simon

"Broadway Bound." She confesses
to the pun and points out that as a
Broadway playwright, Simon's work
has always been bound by the conventions of entertainment. He, to
the delight of his audiences, has
chosen to work within those constraints.
The house was full for Broadway
Bound and the members of the audience rose to their feet at the curtain, laughing through their tears
and clapping like crazy. Undoubtedly, some were applauding because, later, they would have to
face an empty house, a sheaf of divorce papers, or a bothersome old
parent. For a few moments at the
Broadhurst Theatre, Neil Simon
had assured them that you can go
home again.

••
••

After Homecoming
The twelve girls who are sleeping here tonight
For my daughter's twelfth birthday are talking
Seriously now, starts and silences.
They discuss the missing homecoming queen ,
1982 the only blank space
On the silver anniversary floats.
They've learned she's the dead one, not '61 ,
Somebody's mother, so I hear their names,
All those old queens, one whose daughter was queen,
And I want to say the odds seem greater
For succession than death. None of the girls
Are surprised; they see how looks are locusts,
How to master preparation for flight.
They recall colors of hair, dress, flowers;
It's an obituary, and I think
The odds too short for one of these voices,
My eyes circling each hour as I wish
For sixty girls to sleep over, a rush
Of minutes, such confusion of faces
Disappearance might select a stranger
For its guilt-drawn float, me shifting my weight
From torn knee to sound, first step for turning.

Gary Fincke

The Cresset

-

Consumers of
Existence
James Combs
"In the beginning," wrote John
Locke, "all the world was America."
From the very start of the white
European conquest and settlement
of the United States, America became the symbol of Edenic possibilities, of a new start for mankind, of the triumph of Emerson's
"plain old Adam, the simple
genuine self against the whole
world." That "simple genuine self'
has since been the subject of much
exploration and interest, and it is
fair to say that at this late date in
the American story not everyone
agrees that that self has been an
unalloyed blessing.
If it means that in the end all the
world was America's, we evolved
into an imperial self so confident of
the rectitude of our own intentions
that we were willing to conquer or
destroy the world to demonstrate
our power of innocence "against
the whole world." But that is a
political self appropriate to an Augustan age, and there is a question
as to whether we have reached that
state, or ever will, since we are such
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half-hearted imperialists and such
distrusters of concentrated power.
Somehow I doubt if Caesar Augustus ever experienced serious political damage through some errant
centurion attached to the Roman
general staff off on a nutty adventure giving spearheads to the Persians in exchange for gold to finance border wars against the
Goths.
The American Self, however,
does have its mysteries, and whatever it may lack in depth it makes
up for in flexibility. Looking at the
literature on us, from Tocqueville
to Bellah, you get the idea that
Americans are a ghostly lot, restless
both in body and soul, unsure of
boundaries but sure of new beginnings, and able to incorporate into
being and culture an astonishing
array of beliefs and objects. It was
this capacity that exasperated William James: "Americans like to believe in things. They'll believe in
anything. They'd believe in everything if they could." Well, maybe
not everything, but pretty close:
those who believe in the elite imposition of a stultifying "cultural
hegemony" that produces uniformity of thought need a field trip to
Marin County, California.
This is not to say that there
aren't forces that would prefer the
American Self corralled in some
less
expansive,
tolerant,
and
pluralistic ranch. But attempts to
brand us with some form of "minimal self' always seem to fail, especially since the communication revolution and the impulse toward
freedom and experiment its advent
seems to have engendered. A "minimal self' would be substantial, not
ghostly; Protestant, not pantheistic;
sure of the limits of selfhood and
determined to instill it in the
young; able to define a clear role
structure; and without doubt in resisting temptation to expand the
self to incorporate contradictory or
merely new elements and experi-

ences.
A true minimal self would reject
androgyny, Christian rock, and designer jeans, no doubt; but we
don't for what may well be the ultimate American fear: missing out
on something new. We see impulses to create a minimalist
Gemeinschaft as simply one more experiment with the self: the
Baghwhan, PTL, and Esalen are
Millian "experiments in living" as
much as the Amanas and New
Harmonys of old. Werner Erhard,
of "est" fame, last seen mentoring
to the Me Generation, now shows
up in Moscow, telling Soviet managerial types how to "transform
your ability to experience living";
this indicates that maybe somebody
in the American intelligence community still has a sense of what is
truly subversive. But these are simply other way stations on the road
to the ultimate Gesellschaft, the creation of a society of individuals
bound together only by their commitment to the logical culmination
of individualism, doing your own
thing.

It was William James
who said, "Americans
like to believe in
things. They'll believe
in anything. They'd
believe in everything
if they could."
In reality, there are considerable
"hegemonic," if you will, constraints on such an impulse, but
often these constraints are frustrated by our very ghostliness. To
use Robert Jay Lifton's metaphor,
we are close to being "Protean,"
changing the shape and contours
and interests of self at will because
it amuses us, it is our "right," and
has become our chief preoccupa-
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tion. If our occupation was our primary concern, we would produce a
disciplined minimal self oriented to
the Franklinian "instrumentalism"
of work. Instead, we are preoccupied with our "expressive self," a
kaleidoscopic Protean self of furious play and, I fear, self-indulgence.
We have become consumers of existence, defining ourselves by the
sheer quantity of "relationships"
and "experiences" that are the happinesses we relentlessly pursue.
James Ogilvy, writing in American
Demographic magazine, argues that
now people want experiences: "The
growth of our economy is no
longer driven by the desires of consumers to accumulate goods. It is
driven by the consumer's quest for
vivid experiences."
The most brute of objects--cars,
housing, refrigerators-become vivifying and life-enhancing non-material ephemera that expand and
enrich our selves. The inward turn
of consumption takes on purifying
and transcending tasks in our
quest. Maybe we are still romantic
innocents at heart, and have avoided the corrupting vanity of
economic and political power by
the heroic exuberance of our own
individual will-to-experience, believing in everything if we can.
The aforementioned Tocqueville
noticed and worried over this potential in modern democratic
societies, fearing, like Bellah and
associates in Habits of the Heart, that
such a pursuit would shut us all up
"in the solitude of (our) own heart"
and that each of us would become
"a stranger to the fate of all the
rest," leading to a "happy and willing" self-enslavement in the prison
of our major creation and possession, our selves. Such a society isolates the individual in an existential
trap, wherein our quest becomes
the pursuit of loneliness.
Community has never been our
strong suit, but if Tocqueville's
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fears have come true, then we may
have become what John Wikse has
called "a culture of idiocy," a collection of private and separate persons defined by our subjective experience, creatures of isolated individualism, for whom freedom is
only freedom from constraint,
locating all worth in interior experience and not in community
achievement. All relationships are
negotiated on the basis of "contractual intimacy," making every commitment a tentative calculation,
subordinate to the interest and
whims of the sovereign self. The
concomitant liberation and imprisonment of self puts us all together
m a room from which there is no
exit.

In Los Angeles, there
is a firm that for a
fee trains people to be
gameshow contestants.
They learn how to be
enthusiastic, quick,
and play games well.
Students of mass communication
who take the Tocquevillian warning
and tradition seriously can find
some recent items that should give
us discomfort. There is a videotape
for sale now that revives, or updates, an old TV gimmick called
"parasocial interaction," where a
media figure talks directly to the
camera, as if just to you alone. The
tape is called "Rent-a-Friend," and
in it an actor talks to you as if he
were your friend, intimate and admiring. The actor tells you that you
have good taste. Pauses are built in
for you to "respond." Like the children who think Mr. Rogers is talking only to them, you can incorporate a "friend" into your private experience without involvement for
42 minutes, or as many times as

you replay the tape.
On the other side of the coin is
a tape "published" by a struggling
New York novelist as an advertisement for herself. The self-produced tape promos her book, but
more importantly, her: the author
as star of a literary video, the sultry
but struggling writer as hero, in
East Village with celebrities, staring
at her word processor, discussing
"lit-ratur" in a tutu, slumming in
an evening gown.
In Los Angeles, there is a firm
that for a fee trains people to be
gameshow contestants. They learn
how to be enthusiastic, quick, and
play well, by taping and refining
the skills that "contestant coordinators" of auditions look for.
"They're looking for fun people,
exciting people who can converse
in a minute or two," the teacher
tells them. "They want outgoing,
healthy people . . . . TV is not for
the introverted." On CBS's latest
folly, The Morning Program, the
Queen of the Networks is coming
ever closer to Paddy Chayevsky's
satirical "Howard Beale Show" in
the movie Network, with "Video
Personal Ads" of selected unmarrieds presenting themselves and
their virtues in a litany of self-designated attributes and interests
which they are willing to share with
someone equally egotistical and
self-important.
The "self industry" includes
many more examples, but these
strike me as most telling: glimpses
of what we may become as a culture, a nation of self-absorption.
Another clue to our condition is
what appears to be a change in the
function of celebrity. Formerly, the
celebrity was an icon, a public persona that represented values and
fantasies we entertained. But increasingly the celebrity serves us as
an ego-trip, a model not only of
glamour and beauty but more of
boundless self-exposure and -indulgence. Celebrities set the standThe Cresset

ard for the consumption of existence by telling us everything about
their oh-so-interesting selves-preferences, whims, fantasies, causes,
optmons. Our national spiritual
leader now is Shirley MacLaine,
who once traveled to China but
now travels to Atlantis in search
not only of her present self but all
of her past selves.
Lacking spiritual depth, we find
inspiration in the pseudo-mysticism
of celebrities with spiritual breadth,
believing in anything and everything. Devoid of the ability to sustain faith and fearful of arduous
introspection, we emulate the
frivolous and easy religiosities of
the famous. In our cars on the way
to work, we play audio tapes of exciting Bible stories, tapes that teach
us through subliminal messages,
mood tapes that calm or arouse,
tapes that reduce "ten American
classics" (Moby Dick, for instance) to
one minute apiece.
We "fill" our empty selves with
the flotsam and jetsam of popular
communication, and our souls are
like a junkyard dog wandering
through a vast collection of abandoned wrecks, the ruined episodes
of all of our past lives, as remote to
the frivolities of our present as Atlantis. Our worship is at the shrine
of our selves, the liturgies conducted at our home "entertainment
center," our prayer always that
there be rendered to us ever new
pseudo-experiences, our gods the
celebrities who lead us in the rituals
of self-celebration.
In some sense, the boundlessness
and frivolity of the American Self
at play is nothing new. Tocqueville
envisioned America as a society
characterized by the transient quest
for status in a fluid, open society,
what Robert Nisbet called "the
theaters of the unending and
agonizing competition among individuals for the attainment of the
marks of status." But now television
and attendant technologies give us
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a capacity to ever re-create our
selves, to find pseudo-experiences
that give loft to our Atlantian fantasies.
We can tape our lives, blend or
erase the past; tape ourselves as the
stars of our own shows; converse
with pseudo-friends and -lovers;
stimulate our moods and fantasies;
"read" ten classics in ten minutes.
We can pursue our vanities all by
ourselves, enjoying ourselves as the
center of our mass-mediated universe, exercising our self-love in
what Wikse calls "self fetishism,"
becoming complete idiots (from, recall, the Greek idiotes, meaning "a
private and separate person").

Our national spiritual
leader now is Shirley
Maclaine, who once
traveled to China but
now travels to Atlantis
in search of all her
present and past selves.
Even more than the god Narcissus, we could become consumed by
the consumption of our own existence, imagining ourselves in a private seance that watches the apparition of our selves being levitated by
our "self-active" media. In a culture
of idiocy, the American Self would
indeed be ghostly, a mercurial poltergeist captured momentarily on
tape but fleeting quickly to the next
pseudo-event.
Our restless quest for self-fulfillment, then, holds the narcissistic
danger of making ourselves objects
of veneration, and using our media
machinery to "program" ourselves
to the exclusion or detriment of
other people. At the pathological
extreme, people may disappear
into self-created universes, video
worlds in which they are absolute
monarchs, with the power to alter

story and character at will.
But for most of us, the use of
self-active media may have a less
autistic effect, but one with longterm social consequences. Our
equation of self-experience with
freedom may make our ability to
sustain enduring and intimate relationships more difficult. Social
observers refer to us as a "light culture," in which one's connections to
everything are light-detached,
transient, easy, uninvolved, and uncommitted.
The primacy of the self gives impetus to the lack of attachment that
underscores the disposability of relationships. As on the soap operas,
the concept of "relationship" is defined as a temporary and easily disposable way of communicating the
primacy of my self to others who
should appreciate its ascendant
worth. A society of egoists can only
exist with light relationships, since
anything heavier would be a weight
on the soaring flight of our lighterthan-air selves. In the twenty-first
century, media technology almost
unimaginable may give further capacity for the American Self to
"lighten up" to the vanishing point.
In 1909, E. M. Forster wrote one
of the classics of science fiction, a
story entitled "The Machine Stops."
In Forster's future, mankind lives
inside a world machine, with each
individual isolated in a cell equipped with sophisticated communication and service machinery. People
are dependent on the machine for
creature comforts, and satisfied
with the constant flow of entertainment.
But mankind has lost contact
with the outside world, with nature
and the human race. One rebel
breaks out, sees stars and other
people. He returns to plead a return to sanity: "Cannot you see . . .
that it is we who are dying, and
that down here the only thing that
really lives is the Machine. . . . It
has robbed us of the sense of space
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and the sense of touch, it has blurred every human relation .... The
machine develops-but not on our
lines. The Machine proceeds-but
not to our goal." In the end, the
Machine stops, disgorging its
frightened dependents into an uncertain world.
The threat of technology is an
old theme in dystopian literature,
but now the advent of self-active
media gives it a new twist with a
very old warning: for everything
we might gain in the exploration of
our selves, something precious and
indeed indispensable for civilization
may be threatened. By becoming
absorbed in relating to ourselves,
we may lose the ability to relate to
others.
This is not to say that everyone is
soon going to become a creature
absorbed in his or her own subjective experience. We are too
pluralistic a people for that. But in
a future where increasing numbers
of us work and play alone at home,
it may be the case that one of those
"plural universes" will be defined
by our private and unique experiences surrounded by the "leading
edge" of technological extensions
of ourselves. This would weaken
our interactive abilities, and make
those who so choose to live outside
themselves dangerously unable to
function as social beings in the way
we are used to expecting.
Those who retreat into the sanctity of inner experience have made
subjectivism into a norm, adding to
the Bill of Rights the right to undisturbed and unshared subjective
experience. They rule over an absolute monarchy of one subject
who allows into his kingdom only
those figures of his own creation or
choice, renting-a-friend or whatever for his own amusement. In
the worst case, we could truly become a nation of strangers, in
which each consciousness could literally be said to be self-centered.

••
••

26

Review Essay

Establishing
Connections
Jill Baumgaertner

Handling Sin
By Michael Malone. Boston:
Little, Brown, 544 pp. $17.95.
Recently I was at a party at one
of those interminable Victorian
houses in Evanston-where the
ceilings stretch forever, the entranceway is large enough to hold a
sequoia, and one glossy-floored
parlor leads to another. The conversation that evening was The
House-and stories were swapped
about wood-stripping calamities
and housing deals that sounded
like the 1987 yuppie equivalents of
fish-stories ("the one that got away"
where marble fireplaces hid under
careless plaster, and leaded glass
windows waited to be discovered
under piles of old lumber in the
garage).
The most garrulous of the guests
was a man who, having restored his
Hyde Park condo, was now in hot
pursuit of a new old home "with a
yard for the kids"-in Oak Park or
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Evanston maybe, but certainly not
in any other suburb--particularly
not in Wheaton, which was, he informed me, disgustingly conservative and where, at the college, the
football players prayed together before their games. Could I believe
it? he said-in 1987 there was a
place where, my God, students got
down on their knees and prayed
publicly? He could never raise his
children in such a place.
I thought of a lawyer I know
who, as an adjunct professor in
Chicago, teaches occasional courses
in ethics. She announced to me one
day that her son received no religious training at home, and she
wasn't interested in having him receive it at school either. She moved
into the historic district of Oak
Park, she said, because it gave her
a sense of rootedness.
There is a new urgency I have
observed among my peers, as we
barrel into and through our 40s, to
use something tangible, whether it's
a house or grandma's silver to remind us of our "connections" (real
or imagined) to the past, to tradition, to history. It is almost as if a
generation of children raised in
tract housing (in which Efficiency
and Conformity reigned) now look
to the quirks of older architecture
to give them a sense of individuality, a sense of expansiveness, and a
sense of transcendence over the
mundaneness of modern life. This
modern urgency to connect is,
however, highly selective. It omits
the spiritual realm almost entirely.
Michael Malone's most recent
novel, Handling Sin, shows what
happens when Raleigh Whittier
Hayes, an insurance salesman from
Thermopylae, North Carolina, is
rattled out of his normal routine
and into the grace of God. A successful and affluent family man,
Raleigh discovers one day that his
father has checked himself out of
the hospital where he was being
treated for a heart condition, withThe Cresset
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drawn all of his money from the
bank, bought a yellow Cadillac,
and, with a black female mental patient, left Thermopylae, leaving behind a list of tasks he wants Raleigh
to perform if he is interested m
keeping his inheritance.

Not since I read
Joseph Heller's Catch
22 have I laughed so
hard and so continuously
through a book.
Thus begins a modern picaresque, equaling in stature and
magnitude-and romping good
fun-Tom jones or Don Quixote. Not
since I read Joseph Heller's Catch
22 have I laughed so hard and so
continuously through a book. Part
of the humor lies in the wonderful
incongruity of the situations and
the haunting familiarity of so many
of the characters, but the book acquires its depth from its comical
consideration of all of the important spiritual questions. Not all of
Malone's
answers
will
please
everyone who reads this book, but
anyone who has been unsettled by
either pat fundamentalist responses
to serious questions or by the
shoulder shrug of the modern agnostic will find much here to encourage and entertain.
Raleigh Hayes' ancestor, Obed
Hayes, was baptized in America in
1632 "by a Cheapside evangelical
Separatist who was subsequently
hanged for his violent views on
altar cloths." Raleigh himself, baptized and confirmed in the Episcopal church and now a member of
the Baptist church, is actually a
skeptic, not a true believer. Selling
insurance provides a way out for
him-a way, if not to control fate,
then to make it pay for its
blindnesses.
As an eight year old, on the day
of his confirmation, he had made a
March, 1987

deal with God. If God would grant
him superhuman strength, Raleigh
would believe in him. He wrapped
a rope around his waist and tied
the other end to the bumper of his
Uncle Hackney's new Nash. Chanting the Lord's Prayer and Christ's
two commandments, he pulled and
strained-to no avail.
"All right," warned Raleigh and
gave God a final, third chance. He
started to sing the creed he had
struggled so proudly to memorize.
"I believe in one God, the Father
Almighty, Maker of Heaven and
Earth ... ."
He felt something! A tiny lessening of the tension in the rope!
"Heaven and earth . . . Heaven
and earth . .. " Frantically, he tried
to remember what came next in
the Creed, then skipped rushing
ahead, guessing at words he didn't
know. "And of all things visional
and invisible and in one Lord Jesus
Christ, forgotten not made, being
of one supper with the Father by
whom all things were made." He
felt it again! The slack in the rope.
He could take a step. Another step.
The car was moving. Raleigh
strained until his neck ached and
blood ran from the corner of his
lip. He had pulled the blue Nash
ten feet forward when he heard
the hideous sound whose remembrance, even thirty years later,
sweated his hands and face.
The hideous sound was the
laughter of his cousins as they
yelled , "It's Uncle Hackney!" and
Raleigh turned to see his uncle rise
from the rear of the Nash where
he had been pushing, helping
Raleigh and God along. Yelling, "I
don't need any help!" Raleigh established then and there his identity as "the cynical agnostic he was
to remain for the next thirty-seven
years; his atheism tempered only
by the necessity to posit a God in
order to despise Him."
Handling Sin is the chronicle of
Raleigh's gradual awakening on his
journey from Thermopylae to
Charleston to Atlanta to New Orleans. He is able at the end of his

two-week trip to appreciate and celebrate his connections with his
father, his wife, his fat neighbor
Mingo Sheffield, his half-brother,
and various odd characters he picks
up along the way.
God pursues Raleigh in all sorts
of ludicrous ways in Handling Sin.
Beaten by a group Raleigh labels
the "Hell's Angels," he and Mingo
find refuge in a nunnery where he
meets Sister Joe who tells him he
and she are in the same businesslife insurance. At this point in his
journey, however, he is not interested in insuring his immortality.
But he continues on his quest.
In Charleston he returns to his
parked car to find it plastered with
bumper stickers: HONK IF YOU
'\J JESUS! READY OR NOT
JESUS IS COMING! HE IS COMING! Raleigh is dragged to a revivalist meeting where his halfbrother discovers an escaped convict hiding in a cello case. This
man, Simon "The Weeper" Berg,
steals a small painting of the Visitation of Mary and Elizabeth from a
church in Charleston (reminiscent
of O'Connor's story, "The River,"
where a small boy steals a book
about Jesus).
All the while Raleigh finds himself arguing with God. The trouble
with Christ, he thinks, is that "He
never bothered to think of the consequences."
Like when He cast those legions of
devils out of the madman and let
the devil talk Him into putting
them in the pigs instead. What
about the poor farmer who'd
owned those pigs? Imagine how
that farmer'd felt when he heard
his three thousand pigs had gone
crazy and leaped off a precipice!
Imagine how much industry in
those hard times it must have
taken to raise three thousand pigs!
But what did Christ care?
Arriving in New Orleans in a
semt driven by his brother Gates,
and
accompanied
by
Mingo,
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Weeper, the jazz musiCian Toutan
Kingstree, and a Cadillac of his
own picked up along the way,
Raleigh meets as planned with his
father, who has been joined by
Raleigh's aunt Victoria, a retired
missionary. At this point the meaning of Raleigh's mysterious quest
becomes clear to him. He learns
the identity of the black mental patient, and experiences his own "ordination" in a jazz club. It is now
Maundy Thursday and a strange
but engaging version of the Last
Supper takes place before the evening's end. In the early morning
hours of Good Friday, Raleigh's
father asks him what the date is.
"April first, " said Raleigh, whose
watch told him so.
"It is? April Fool's? Well, I'll be
damned . Now, there's a Jesus joke
for you. What I meant was, it's
Good Friday. Now, that's funny,
Raleigh. Old Jesus is hanging
there, they're jabbing swords in
Him and shoving vinegar at Him
and He flops over dead then He
winks open one eye, see, and says,
'April Fool's.'"
"Ha, ha," said Raleigh . "If you
went around in your church saying
things like that, it's no wonder they
fired you. You know, a lot of
people don't find the Crucifixion a
comic matter."
"Well, the joke's on them.''
The father dies, but not before
giving to Raleigh a code to the
treasure that is Raleigh's inheritance. On the flight home to Thermopylae, accompanying his father's
casket, he borrows a Bible and
cracks his father's code, which
Raleigh discovers embedded in the
book of Job. "In so doing, he
parenthetically read the miserable
man's story, struck by echoes of his
own indignation, his own refusals
to deny his righteousness, his own
realization that his righteousness
was, like this tiny aluminum container now shooting through the
measureless night, neither here nor
there."
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In the final lines of the novel, at
his father's funeral service on Easter Monday, with the promise of
the resurrection now fully realized,
Raleigh himself, with "the Son of
God grinning like a fool through
the stained-glass window," begins to
understand what the resurrection
means. He rediscovers his true connections, and begins to see that
now at age 45 he can pick up
where he left off at age eight. No,
he can't do it all by himself. He will
always need help. And, yes, God
has endowed him with superhuman
strength, so long as he depends on
the strength of others. This
strength looks peculiarly like weakness to the worldly.
I can discern only one weakness
in the novel. Occasionally, the antics of the characters (a duel in
Stone Mountain Park, Ga., and a
chase scene that involves cable cars
and canoes) smack too much of
Hollywood. At these points the
novel begins to lose some of its credibility and the reader begins to feel
that Mr. Malone is getting ready to
sell out. In fact, he indicates in his
list of acknowledgements at the beginning of the book that Hollywood is considering adapting the
novel to the screen.
This development is not surprising, considering cinema's current
interest in versions and perversions
of things Southern. I recently read
an interview of Pat Conroy, the author of The Great Santini, who
quotes his mother's summary of all
of Southern literature: "The day
the hogs ate Willie, momma died
when she found out what daddy
had been doing to sister."
This exaggeration of the Southern grotesque has been visible most
recently in the film Crimes of the
H eart, which wallows in caricature.
Flannery O'Connor also used caricature, but while she was revealing
the humor and irony of Southernisms, she never lost respect for the
characters creating them. Hoi-

lywood does not understand this
kind of respect, so I'll be surprised
if the screenplay writers and the director preserve the integrity of
Handling Sin. Its message may be
too radically religious for most
theatre goers.
This novel, Malone's fifth book
of fiction, takes its title from a
fourteenth-century poem by Robert
Mannyng of Brunne. Handlyng
Synne was a work of lay religious
instruction which included tales, a
handbook, and other devotional
material. How appropriate that
Michael Malone roots in the past
this book about recovering connections-not only the literary traditions of Fielding, Cervantes, and
Dickens, but also the spiritual traditions of the Church and the truth
of the gospel.
Cl

J. Paul
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Museum
Malibu, California

The guards slide
noiselessly on thick currents
of air
and breathe in modulated tones;
their senses flair like gills,
their long fingers fold
unseen creases
on their psyches.
Eyes, always grey,
remember the meaning of grace
and style
but have forgotten the rain
outside and the lovers
on the beach.
They hover between rooms
and strike poses against cracking
canvas
knowing the rest of us provide
their frames.

J. T. Ledbetter
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The End of
Evil Empire?
Albert R. Trost
In the several months since the
American
national
elections,
Mikhail Gorbachev has received a
better press in the United States
and Western Europe than has
Ronald Reagan.
Some of the reasons for this extraordinary development are not
hard to see. The President's problems with the "lragua scandal" (or
Irangate if you prefer) are enough
to lower the popular standing of
any national leader, but they have
hurt Reagan in a special way.
His most significant achievement
as President has been his ability to
restore confidence in his office.
Until November of last year, Mr.
Reagan had an unusually high
standing for a second-term President in mid-term on the critical
public opinion dimension of confidence in his leadership. He maintained this high level of respect and
confidence even though a majority
of Americans continued to disagree
with him on critical policy questions. People seemed to believe that
he was operating from a position of
high principle, of clarity of pur-

Albert R. Trost, a regular contributor
to The Cresset on public affairs, is
Chairman of the Political Science Department at Valparaiso University.
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pose, of honesty and sincerity.
They seemed ready to forgive him
for unpopular positions, factual
mistakes, and lapses of memory.
However, the recent revelations
that link a deal with Iran for hostages and aid to the "contras" in
Nicaragua are a direct challenge to
the positive features of his image.
To compound the President's
image problem, a more assertive,
more Democratic Congress presses
the attack on those Reagan policies
that never were well-supported in
public opinion, such as American
involvement in Central America.
There is no doubt that President
Reagan's stock is at a low ebb, but
who would ever have thought that
a General Secretary of the Communist Party of the Soviet Union
would be a rival for popularity?
The immediate reasons for this
amazing development include the
advent of a Soviet leader who probably is very different from past
leaders of the Brezhnev-Chernenko
mold, a well-run propaganda campaign out of the Soviet Union to
emphasize the freshness,
the
dynamism, the urbaneness, and
above all, the good intentions of
the new General Secretary, and a
true longing in the West for a reduction in tensions with the Soviet
bloc. President Reagan and some
conservative supporters may still be
using the "evil empire" tag, but
there does not seem to be much inclination to see the emperor himself as evil.
Though we know a good deal
more about Soviet society and the
lower levels of the government and
the Communist Party than was
known thirty years ago, the top
levels of the Soviet system remain
as hidden and mysterious as ever.
Anything one reads about the top
level of political decision-making in
the Soviet Union, the Politburo or
the top party secretaries in Moscow, must be treated as speculation,
informed though it may sometimes

be. We are provided with names
and somewhat longer biographies
for the people at the top level than
we used to be, but the conflicts, the
factions, and the processes that
characterize those heights remain
out of view. However, speaking
speculatively, many believe that
Gorbachev represents a change in
the style of leadership for his country, as well as a change in policy
emphasis.
It is a fact that Mikhail Gorbachev is the youngest Soviet
leader in twenty years, having assumed his office at age 54. After
the last three leaders died in office
from problems associated with old
age, Gorbachev's relative youth by
itself raised expectations in the
West. An urbane and out-going
personality and an attractive wife
(not usual attributes of a Soviet
General Secretary) hyped expectations further.

In the several months
since the American
elections, Gorbachev has
received a better press
in the U.S. and in
Western Europe than
has President Reagan.
Of the three previous leaders of
the Soviet Union, Gorbachev was
most closely associated with Yuri
Andropov, whose tenure, though
very short, was dramatic. Andropov
announced a campaign against corruption, laziness, and alcoholism in
the workplace and used auditing
and police raids to back it up.
Against the status-quo image of his
predecessor, Brezhnev, and his successor, Chernenko, his policies almost seemed radical.
Gorbachev was identified with
these anti-corruption policies, and
since coming to office has done
nothing to change that association.
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Indeed, he has been vigorous m
announcing drives of his own
against corruption. He has mostly
purged the members of the ruling
Politboro who were associated with
the careers of Brezhnev and Chernenko, or who might be associated
with sloth or corruption. In total,
Gorbachev has now changed over
half of the membership of the 18member Politburo. For these actions he IS being praised as
courageous
and
determined.
(When Stalin purged the members
of his ruling circle, he was called
ruthless; admittedly, purging had a
rather more ominous meaning in
Stalin's day.)
Gorbachev has announced new
Soviet positions on arms control
and disarmament in the last five
months. He has also announced
Russian troop withdrawals in Afghanistan, though these have not
been as significant as originally indicated. On balance, the break-up
of the summit meeting in Iceland
last year without an agreement was
blamed more on President Reagan
than on Secretary Gorbachev. Mr.
Gorbachev is not likely to receive
next year's Nobel Peace Prize, but
few have suggested that his desire
for significant arms reductions is
anything but sincere. He is widely
recognized as wanting arms reductions to divert money from defense
to other domestic priorities. Not
many
suggest that
President
Reagan has the same immediate
goals.
The "liberal" tendencies of Gorbachev have received much favorable comment. These acts include
his freeing of the dissident intellectual, Andrei Sakharov, and his attempted reforms of the Soviet
economy by legitimating some of
the black-market provision of consumer goods and services in large
cities and the encouragement to
collective farmers to raise and market privately-raised crops at "free
market" prices. These latter policies
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are being seen as the equivalent of
the Hungarian Communist Party's
sustained economic liberalization
and the "four modernizations"
campaign in China. They are seen
as a start in bringing profit incentives into a socialist economy. The
fact that these reforms may face
some opposition within top circles
of Soviet leadership from "conservatives" or "hardliners" qualifies
them even more for a "liberal"
label.

Gorbachev is not likely
to receive next year's
Nobel Peace Prize, but
few have suggested that
his desire for
significant arms cuts
is anything but sincere.
Reports have recently appeared
on the outcome of the January
meeting of the Central Committee
of the Communist Party of the
Soviet Union. This meeting had
been delayed several months, leading to speculation in the Western
press that Gorbachev was lining up
support for maJor reforms. Official
Soviet reports of what transpired
did not disappoint. They announced that another member of
the Politburo associated with corruption and with Mr. Brezhnev,
Dinmukhamed Kunaev, had been
dropped from that body.
But the news that most captured
the attention of the Western press
was that the Communist Party had
decided to move to secret ballots in
the election of party secretaries at
lower levels. Previously, these elections had been by show of hands
and, in practice, often by acclamation. Again, the speculative implication of this reform is that the secret
ballot will allow for contested elections for these important party

posts.
The Economist, a British weekly
news magazine and the epitome of
non-sensational and middle-of-theroad journalism, in its January 31st
issue summarized this story on its
cover (in red), "Democracy?". The
headlines over the two articles on
the Central Committee meeting
were "Biggish Step for Russia,
Small One for Democracy" and "A
Breath of Fresh Air." (There was
one story on President Reagan,
focusing on his State of the Union
Address. Its headline was "The
Messenger, Not the Message." It
called attention to his age, 76. The
main point of the article was that
the address was all style and no
substance, and it was accompanied
by a derogatory political cartoon.)
While there is no quarreling with
the favorable impression that General Secretary Gorbachev has made
on many Western journalists and
political leaders, one must remain
skeptical about the man behind the
image. Much of the image depends
on official Soviet reports and on
carefully-staged
public
appearances. The latter events are helped
by the evident self-confidence of
Mr. Gorbachev in public. However,
it goes without saying that the
Soviet Union lacks a competitive
free press that might point out
Gorbachev's mistakes, shortcomings, and failings. The Soviet press
is under the direct control of the
Communist Party, and Western access to news sources is tightly controlled.
The importance of propaganda
to the present Soviet leaders can itself be speculated upon; the
meager tea leaves can be searched
for clues. At the same January
Central Committee meeting mentioned above, the head of the party
propaganda department (in the
CPSU Secretariat) was elevated to
membership in the Politburo. This
propaganda position had been unrepresented at this level for some
The Cresset

time.
One person besides President
Reagan who has clearly voiced his
skepticism about the liberalism of
the Soviet leader is West German
Chancellor Helmut Kohl. During
last month's parliamentary election
campaign in Germany he compared Gorbachev's manipulation of
public opinion to that of Goebbels
in Nazi Germany. He was roundly
criticized by his opposition and by
much of the Western European
press for this and several other
"anti-detente" remarks.
Objectivity would require any observer to admit that the system in
the Soviet Union remains an authoritarian one. Political and religious dissidents remain in jails and
camps. There is only one legal
political party, and almost every aspect of society remains under the
control of that party. However, it is
change and positive features that
have recently been emphasized,
and perhaps inflated.
Both the mass public and certain
foreign policy elites are especially
open to receiving a favorable image
of the Soviet Union and its leader
at this particular time. The Cold
War, with its dramatic events like
the Berlin Airlift and the Korean
War, blurred into the ambiguity of
the Vietnam War and the softer
strains of Ostpolitik and detente in
the · 1970s. The "successor generation" is now maturing and coming to
power in Western Europe, a generation that does not have direct experience of World War II or the
formative years of the Cold War in
the late 1940s and early 1950s.
In most of the countries of Europe, the generation now reaching
political maturity has never known
war or economic want. Prosperity
and peace seem natural. Perhaps
there is more skepticism in the
United States about achieving
peace, but there is a longing for
security free of tension and a desire to preserve our affluence.
March, 1987

Friendship with a friendly Soviet
Union is bound to be alluring.
More articulate and activist foreign
policy groups which had focused
their attention on arms control and
disarmament in the 1970s are frustrated with lack of progress towards these goals in the 1980s. For
many of these groups understanding of and reconciliation with the
Soviet Union has become an alternative goal. Seminars and panels
on the Soviet Union are once again
popular, on campus as well as
among community groups.
As Chair of our university's
Overseas Studies Committee, I receive an annual mailing on tours
and programs available in the
Soviet Union from the official
Soviet tourist agency. This year's

booklet was at least twice as thick as
usual, and the clear theme of many
of the tours was on friendship and
understanding. In a number of
them the opportunity was offered
for tourists to meet like-minded
Soviet groups and individuals, such
as peace groups, women's groups,
teachers, etc.
In this atmosphere, the idea of
an "evil empire" is increasingly
going to be a "hard sell," to say
nothing of that of an "evil emperor." Through this period of
changing attitudes toward the
Soviet Union and its dynamic
leader, it is nonetheless important
to remember that we still do not
know "the half of it"-perhaps a
good deal less-about life at the
top in the U.S.S.R.
Cl

New Tenants
From a world beyond dredging of willowsfar beyond Old Matthew's tumbledown orchards
and hedgerows and still-frozen pond-she came
just that once, and then vanished, forever
it seems now, where the hole in our toolshed
has long needed mending.
Spewed from that hole
since last blizzard, as if it and it only
had birthed them, six caramel kittens
tangle, spar, tumble, explode in the leaves.
Scale to the bending matched cedars at
walk's end. Leap limb by limb maples onto
our porch roof. Scatter like buckshot when
door sounds its opening.
All that is left then,
igniting the dark jagged recesses of
woodpile, reviewing--oh, fiercely enoughlmy moccasined passing, is the fire from
twelve wild honey eyes. Gifts left by
a gold gypsy mother.

Lois Reiner
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Kill the Ref!
Dot Nuechterlein
Please bear with me for a bit; no
doubt as you read this the basketball season is almost over for the
year, but I just had a priceless basketball experience, and the story
needs to be shared right now.
People who know me-and
others who read my bumper
sticker-know that I am a roundball freakout. A major pleasure in
my life is sitting at the officials'
table scoring the men's varsity
games at my school; I could hardly
get through winter without it.
To aid this hobby I have taken
University-credit courses in coaching theory and officiating; as a result I am licensed in Indiana to referee games at the high school and
junior high level. This is something
of a joke among my nearest and
dearest, but not to worry-no way
would yours truly run up and
down the floor during regular
games. Or so I thought.
Yesterday , morning the teacher
who arranges games for my
church's parochial school called. At
the last minute an away game was
moved to home; no one else was
available; could I possibly consider
officiating a 5th-6th grade girls'
game at 3:30 p.m.?
People who know me also know
that I will say yes to nearly anything. Besides, we had big-time varsity action scheduled for 7:30, and
this would help me pass the pregame hours. (That game turned
out to be an overtime thriller, by
the way, so probably I should have
spent the afternoon doing something stressless.)
When I mentioned reviewing the
rules my teacher friend laughed.
"Don't worry about it," he said,
"this is not very high level." But I
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studied a little anyway. Mistake.
The hand signals, which I recognize so well when others make
them, blurred together, and the
finer points crammed for exams
had fled the mind. The other ref
will have to be on his toes, I
thought.
Arriving at the gym early I
found the home team coach with
two dozen red-suited girls. My children had attended that school and
once I knew nearly everyone, but
now I recognized only a few.
I asked if the other ref had arrived, and the coach smiled. I live
a rather public life and do not
often feel terribly nervous or uncomfortable, but wow, the feeling
of terror that flooded my soul at
his words: "Didn't you know?
You're it."
People began arriving. Spotting a
colleague, a player's father, I asked
him to please refrain from yelling
at the ref today. "Oh, no," he said,
"I paid my money and I am entitled to chew you out royally."
Another friend , a mother, asked
if I had heard about the last game;
there were so many fouls that the
six-minute quarters totalled 90
minutes. Someone mentioned how
interminable things were before alternating
possessions
replaced
jump balls. The scorekeeper, who
was new at the job, said he had to
leave early.
By 4:00 we began to wonder
about the other team . The words
"Forfeit" and "Please God" were
forming in my mind when in they
came; they had been stuck at a railroad crossing en route. Their coach
seemed a bit anxious: he had
hoped the game would go quickly.
His seven players dressed hurriedly
in green and we got the game underway without their warming up.
The coaches agreed on five-minute
quarters.
Things started well-the opening
toss was reasonably straight. Being
the tallest person on the floor

(which isn't saying much) I decided
I need not worry about goaltending
calls.
It was challenge enough to make
sure everyone stayed within the
outside boundaries. I had expected
a lot of traveling, but didn't see
much. I saw a lot of fouls, but
didn't call many. What I saw and
called all afternoon were tie ups
and jump balls, probably twenty or
more per quarter. I forgot the
hand signals and just yelled out
"Red ball" or "Green ball," over
and over. Never outside of my dentist's chair have five-minute segments of time gone so slowly.
At halftime I apologized to the
coaches for not calling more fouls.
It didn't make for a good teaching
situation, I realized. "You're doing
fine, " they said. In their view the
game was moving right along.
The kids were totally intense.
One small girl could steal the ball
and dribble like crazy down the
floor; someone bigger usually took
it away and then they chased one
another back to the other end. I
normally run several miles a day,
but I could barely keep up with all
of that energy.
The seven greens got to play a
lot, of course; the reds were
platooned five at a time, every
couple of minutes. Somebody got
an accidental elbow in the tummy
and someone else had a shoelace to
tie, so we took a couple of brief
respites. A green teammate, playing the whole time, said she was
glad to have a little rest.
Later someone mentioned the
wonderful look on the faces of the
players who managed to get the
ball into the basket. I missed that,
but it did seem that everyone was
having a good time-even the lady
in the zebra shirt, who is used to
watching the action sitting down
with a pencil in hand.
Oh, yes. The final score of my
first official game? Red 6, Green 2.
Long live basketball.
Cl
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